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CAN THE PRESIDENT CONTROL THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE?
Bruce A. Green* & Rebecca Roiphe**
As the investigation into President Trump’s campaign ties to Russia grows
increasingly intense, it is critical to understand how much control the President has
over the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Some critics claim that
the President has absolute power to direct federal prosecutors and control their
decisions. The President and his lawyers, joined by several scholars, take this claim
one step further by arguing that the chief executive could not be guilty of
obstruction of justice because his control over all prosecutorial decisions is
absolute. This issue last arose during the Nixon Administration. The Department of
Justice and the Special Prosecutor disagreed about whether the President, as head
of the Executive Branch under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, could direct
individual prosecutions if he so chose. The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon
left the issue unresolved and has never revisited it.
This Article addresses the question of presidential power principally from a
historical perspective. It argues that the Department of Justice is independent of the
President, and its decisions in individual cases and investigations are largely
immune from his interference or direction. This does not follow from any explicit
constitutional or legislative mandate, but is based on an evolving understanding of
prosecutorial independence and professional norms.
American democratic discourse has included the value of independent prosecutions
from its inception, and scholars have debated how much this concept influenced the
initial structure of American government. In the late eighteenth century, federal
prosecutors enjoyed a significant degree of independence from the White House,
both because of the diffuse local nature of federal prosecutions and the vague and
overlapping lines of authority. As federal law grew in scope and complexity, there
was an increased need to consolidate and rationalize the legal arm of the
government. Ultimately, the Department of Justice assumed this function under the
Executive Branch. In 1870, when it created the law department, Congress was not
overly concerned that partisan politics would infiltrate and undermine the rule of
law, because at the time, expertise, including professional norms for attorneys, was
considered the ultimate protection against partisan corruption. In arguing that
professional norms operated as an internal barrier between the Department of
Justice and the remainder of the Executive Branch, this Article contributes to a
growing debate about intra-branch checks and balances.

* Louis Stein Chair, Fordham University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
We would like to thank the participants in the annual Legal Ethics Schmooze held at UCLA
School of Law in July 2017. We would also like to thank Miriam Baer, Doni Gewirtzman, Peter
Margulies, Ed Purcell, Jessica Roth, and Ellen Yaroshefsky, who provided thoughtful suggestions and
guidance on earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
As President Trump seeks to undermine the investigation into his
campaign’s ties to Russia, it is hard to ignore echoes of the Nixon
Administration. When Trump fired FBI director James Comey, and again,
after reports that he planned to fire Special Counsel Robert Mueller,
journalists and critics compared the incidents to the “Saturday Night
Massacre.”1 In 1973, President Nixon directed Attorney General Elliot
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to fire
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; Richardson and Ruckelshaus
each in turn refused and resigned, leaving Solicitor General Robert Bork to
follow the President’s order.2 Unlike Nixon, whose motive may have
remained unspoken, President Trump admitted that he fired “nut job”
Comey in order to slow the pace or even stall the investigation into his
campaign’s connection with Russia.3
In an interview with the New York Times, President Trump claimed, “I
have absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department,”
and warned that he was only permitting the investigation to continue “for
[the] purposes of hopefully thinking I’m going to be treated fairly.”4 Some
insist that by attempting to derail a federal investigation in order to avoid
criminal and political repercussions, Trump was guilty of obstruction of
justice.5 But one of Trump’s supporters, former Speaker of the House Newt
1. David A. Graham, The Saturday Night Massacre That Wasn’t, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-saturday-night-massacre-that-wasnt/551543/;
Joe Sterling, Comey Firing Draws Comparisons to Nixon’s ‘Saturday Night Massacre,’ CNN (May 10,
2017, 1:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/09/politics/comey-saturday-night-massacre/index.html.
2. See Graham, supra note 1; Sterling, supra note 1.
3. See Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey Eased Pressure
from Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/us/
politics/trump-russia-comey.html.
4.
Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html. His lawyers have
made a similar claim. See Letter of Marc E. Kasowitz, Counsel to the President, to Robert S. Mueller,
Special Counsel (June 23, 2017), as reprinted and discussed in The Trump Lawyers’ Confidential
Memo to Mueller Explained, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06
/02/us/politics/trump-legal-documents.html (asserting that the Constitution gives the President
“exclusive authority over the ultimate conduct and disposition of all criminal investigations and over
those executive branch officials responsible for conducting those investigations”). The President’s
spokesman and lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, has echoed this theory, arguing that the President could shoot
James Comey without being indicted. John Wagner, Giuliani: Under Constitution Trump Could Shoot
Comey and Not Be Indicted, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
giuliani-under-constitution-trump-could-shoot-comey-and-not-be-indicted/2018/06/04/8107ed96-67e211e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.26f6519875b4.
5. See Can the President Obstruct Justice, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.politico
.com/magazine/story/2017/12/04/can-the-president-obstruct-justice-216008; Laurence H. Tribe,
Opinion, Trump Must Be Impeached. Here’s Why, WASH. POST (May 13, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-must-be-impeached-heres-why/2017/05/13/82ce2ea 4-374d11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.0bdc9638175e.
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Gingrich, argued that “the president of the United States cannot obstruct
justice,” because as chief executive officer the President has full power to
direct federal prosecutions and fire anyone who does not comply.6 The
exchange reflects a fundamental disagreement about the structure of the
Executive Branch.
This Article identifies and analyzes the flaws in the argument that the
President controls federal prosecutors. Prosecutorial independence has
become a cornerstone of American democracy, built into the way the
country is governed. Although no constitutional provision or statute explicitly establishes prosecutorial independence, neither does any law expressly
grant the President absolute power over federal prosecutions. It is
Congress’s role to determine the extent of the President’s criminal-justice
power, and Congress has acquiesced in the norm and practice of respecting
prosecutors’ independence. Prosecutors’ professional obligation of federal
independence, or “aloofness” as it is called in England, limits the President’s ability to control individual criminal investigations or prosecutorial
decisions.7 The President retains the power to fire the Attorney General, but
government lawyers must resist or resign if the President directs them to

6. Sumner Park, Gingrich: A President ‘Cannot Obstruct Justice,’ THE HILL (June 16, 2017,
1:15 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/338147-gingrich-a-president-cannot-obstructjustice. Alan Dershowitz made similar claims immediately after Trump fired Comey. See, e.g., Alan
Dershowitz, Opinion, History, Precedent, and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show that Trump Did
Not Obstruct Justice, WASH. EXAMINER (June 8, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alandershowitz-history-precedent-and-james-comeys-opening-statement-show-that-trump-did-not-obstructjustice/article/2625318 (comparing Trump’s firing Comey to President Bush’s pardon of Caspar
Weinberger). Professor John Yoo, who is best known for authoring the so-called Torture Memos, has
agreed with Dershowitz, arguing that Trump could be impeached for his acts but could not be indicted
for obstruction of justice because of his position as chief executive. John Yoo & Saikrishna Prakash,
Opinion, Don’t Prosecute Trump. Impeach Him, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/04/opinion/trump-impeach-constitution.html.
7. For a discussion of the doctrine in England, see JOHN LL. J. EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 67–74 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1992) (1984).
Even those who argue that the Attorney General in England does have a political role insist that
political considerations ought not to affect him when he is supposed to act in an impartial or quasijudicial manner. Id. at 68–69 (quoting Sir Elwyn Jones). For example, in 1924, after the Attorney
General dropped charges against a Communist newspaper editor at Labor Party officials’ direction, he
was censured over this incident, ultimately leading to the resignation of the entire Administration. Ben
Heraghty, Defender of the Faith? The Role of the Attorney-General in Defending the High Court, 28
MONASH U. L. REV. 206, 214–15 (2002). In France, which has an inquisitorial model of prosecution, a
recent law insulates prosecutors from interference by the ministry in individual cases. Loi 2013-669 du
25 juillet 2013, relative aux attributions du garde des sceaux et des magistrats du ministère public en
matière de politique pénale et de mise en œuvre de l’action publique [Law 2013-669 of July 25, 2013
relative to the attributions of the keeper of the seals and the magistrates of the public ministry in matters
of penal policy and implementation of public action] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 26, 2014, p. 12441. For a discussion of the
increasingly ambiguous role of the French prosecutor, see Jacqueline Hodgson and Laurène Soubise,
Prosecution in France, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (Oxford U. Press 2016), https:/
/papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980309 (follow “Open PDF in Brower”).
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act contrary to the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion8 because in
criminal prosecutions—as in other contexts—the exercise of professional
discretion is built into the structure of American government.9
As the American administrative state grew beginning in the latenineteenth century, its architects took for granted that prosecutorial
independence would serve as an important check on partisan politics. The
Executive is not a monolith, but rather a myriad of agencies that enjoy
degrees of independence from the President. The diffuse nature of the
American Executive is not an accident. As the federal government grew,
expert agencies served to limit presidential control. Prosecutors’ professional norms, experience, and proximity to the facts of a case comprise one
such check. These norms are vital to protect the democratic values of
equality and fairness in the administration of the criminal law from the
encroachment of partisan politics.10
By analyzing prosecutorial independence, this Article contributes to a
scholarly conversation about the power of the Executive.11 It adds to the
voices of a growing number of scholars who see the Executive not as
unitary, but as a complex whole, whose parts serve as checks on one
8. For an argument that government lawyers have a limited role in resisting presidential power,
see W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration (Jan. 31, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906422 (follow “Open
PDF in Browser”).
9. For a defense of discretion, see H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013)
(previously unpublished essay based on a talk given to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group in
November 1956). Many scholars have pointed to the dangers of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g.,
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968)
(discussing the dangers of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (arguing that
prosecutorial discretion leads to racial injustice); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 47–52
(1991) (arguing that the duty to “do justice” is inadequate). Others recognize that discretion has a
potentially powerful possibility to correct for errors in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Bruce A.
Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 (2017).
10. Politics has multiple meanings. For the purposes of this Article, when we refer to partisan
politics, we are referring to the personal drive for power or the efforts of a particular party to manipulate
the system to gain or maintain control of the government. Politics can also, obviously, be a good thing,
as it is the foundation of a democratic state. Democratic accountability rests on a healthy political
debate in which certain individuals and parties embrace particular ideological and policy objectives.
The difficult balance in the relationship between the White House and the Department of Justice
involves ensuring democratic accountability in the administration of criminal law while preventing
partisan politics from distorting and undermining criminal justice in any case. For a discussion of the
roles informal norms play in American democracy, see Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article
II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018).
11. Compare STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3–38 (2008) (advocating a unitary Executive
Branch controlled by the President), with Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (arguing against the unitary
view of the Executive), and Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016) (explaining how the
administrative branch is divided among three rivalrous parts).
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another. Not only does it provide historical support for, and an example of,
“intra-branch” separation of powers, it also further explains the meaning of
the term by demonstrating how lawyers’ professional norms provide a basis
for internal limits on the President’s power.12 In order to ensure democratic
accountability, the President’s legitimate policy agenda may shape
prosecutorial priorities, but partisan politics and personal interest must play
no role in determining the course of individual cases.
It is not always easy to distinguish between legitimate policy objectives
reflecting the President’s platform and agenda and illegitimate interference
with prosecutorial discretion. The democratic system has grown to rely on
lawyers’ professional norms to distinguish between the two. Department of
Justice (DOJ) policies reinforce this core requirement, making it clear that
experienced prosecutors whose professional obligations require them to
filter out impermissible considerations, control decision-making in individual cases.13 While this prophylactic is not a panacea, it helps to insulate
prosecutors and protect against illegitimate incursions on discretion.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys relevant law
establishing that the President lacks enumerated or inherent constitutional
power over individual prosecutions. This Part considers counterarguments
based on the text of the Constitution, original understanding, and analogous
executive powers, but concludes that, while prosecution is an executive
function, Congress can restrict presidential control over individual prosecutions. Because federal legislation does not expressly allocate ultimate
prosecutorial authority within the Executive Branch, one must look to
Congress’s implied intent. The history of American prosecution and
prosecutorial independence sheds light on this difficult task.
Part II discusses the history and development of the federal criminal
justice system and the centrality of prosecutorial independence to it. This
Part analyzes the role of prosecutorial independence in American
democracy by examining the historical relationship between the President
and federal prosecutors. In the early republic, Presidents at times exerted
control over federal prosecutions, especially when the cases had implications for other federal policy objectives, but most prosecutors enjoyed
substantial—if not complete—independence. By the end of the twentieth
century, prosecutorial independence had grown from the inchoate reality of
a diffuse nation into a central principle of federal prosecution.
Part III of the Article demonstrates that prosecutorial independence is
12. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Katyal,
supra note 11; Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032 (2011); Michaels, supra note 11; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Margo Schlanger, Offices of
Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014).
13. Green & Roiphe, supra note 9.
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not only built into the structure of American government, but also is a
desirable feature of American democracy. The effective and impartial
administration of justice rests on a healthy distance between the President
and prosecuting attorneys. Helping to ensure the fair and just administration of law, discretion preserves prosecutorial judgment based on
knowledge of the law, facts, and a familiarity and respect for process.
Professional independence helps ensure that prosecutors will be able to
exercise that discretion and seek a fair and just administration of criminal
law in individual cases, rather than sacrifice justice to further political ends.
I. LAW GOVERNING THE PRESIDENT’S ABILITY TO CONTROL
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Some scholars argue that a U.S. President can require the Attorney
General or a subordinate federal prosecutor to initiate or dismiss a criminal
prosecution and otherwise control the prosecutor’s discretionary decisions.14 Others insist that the President has no such power and that, to the
contrary, the prosecutor has a legal obligation to resist presidential control
and to exercise independent professional judgment.15 This Part argues that
the President does not have constitutional authority to conduct criminal
prosecutions, and that it is for Congress to decide whether the Attorney
General and subordinate prosecutors are subject to presidential control or
must act independently of the President. The task remains to determine to
whom Congress has allocated ultimate authority in criminal cases—a
question on which historic practice and policy may offer guidance.
A. Defining the Question of Presidential Criminal-Justice Authority
The President has authority to set and promote criminal justice policy,
to appoint and discharge the Attorney General, and to issue pardons.16 But
whether the President may interfere in individual criminal prosecutions is a
separate question that the Constitution does not expressly answer. Consider
the following scenarios:
 The DOJ conducts a corruption investigation of a city mayor
who has been highly critical of the President. The Attorney
General briefs the President that there is probable cause to indict the Mayor, but that the prosecutors conducting the investigation do not intend to seek an indictment because they have
14.

For a discussion of this view, see infra note 68; see also infra note 82 and accompanying

text.
15. For a discussion of this view, see infra note 68.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1–2.
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reasonable doubts and do not think they can secure a conviction. The President directs the DOJ to indict.
 The DOJ conducts a corruption investigation of the President’s
former campaign manager. The Attorney General briefs the
President that there is compelling evidence of guilt, and that
the prosecutors conducting the investigation intend to seek an
indictment. The President directs the DOJ to drop the investigation.
 A foreign government arrests a U.S. citizen for espionage. The
President directs the Attorney General to arrest a prominent
citizen of the foreign country when he is in the U.S. for
business so that the U.S. has a bargaining chip. The Attorney
General believes that the foreign citizen has not committed any
crime, but that the DOJ can pull together circumstantial evidence of a crime that will (barely) satisfy the test of probable
cause.
Assume that in each of these scenarios the Attorney General protests
that it would be unprofessional to follow the President’s direction, or that
doing so would be contrary to internal DOJ policy and guidelines and to
long-held understandings about the exercise of prosecutorial power in the
federal government. The President is undeterred and threatens to fire the
Attorney General unless he complies. Is the Attorney General permitted, or
even obliged, to follow the President’s direction? If the Attorney General
capitulates and directs lower level prosecutors to follow the President’s
orders, are they similarly required to obey?
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that federal criminal
prosecution is an executive function under Article II of the Constitution,
not a legislative or judicial function or a function that the Executive Branch
shares with another government branch.17 But designating criminal prosecution an “executive” function does not necessarily determine who within
the Executive Branch has authority to make particular prosecutorial decisions. Criminal prosecution is not among the presidential powers enumerated in Article II.18 Federal legislation creates a Department of Justice
17. 487 U.S. 654, 696–679, 692 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions performed by
the independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”). While both the majority and
dissent take this for granted, scholars have debated this point from a historical perspective, pointing to
the fact that early federal prosecution was conducted largely by private parties and states. E.g., Daniel
N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: The Preeminent
Executive, 53 ALB. L. REV. 49, 56–57 (1988).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States; . . . he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”).
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with subordinate prosecutors headed by the Attorney General who
collectively have authority to conduct federal criminal prosecutions.19 The
question remains whether the President’s authority as chief executive,20
which includes a constitutional responsibility to “take care” that subordinate officers faithfully carry out their law enforcement responsibilities,21
implies that the President has authority, if he chooses to exercise it, to make
prosecutorial decisions within the bounds of the law. Even if the
Constitution does not itself commit control of criminal prosecutions to the
President, is this authority implicit in the statutory establishment of the
DOJ headed by an Attorney General who serves at the President’s will?
The President—as chief executive—clearly possesses some authority,
including policymaking authority, with respect to federal criminal justice.22
As President Obama recently described,23 the President may establish
priorities for federal criminal law enforcement, and need not leave this
responsibility entirely to the Attorney General.24 The President’s policy
priorities—for instance, a decision to defer to state laws legalizing marijuana—may have implications for individual criminal cases, at least
indirectly.
The President’s only explicit constitutional role in individual criminal
cases is to issue pardons,25 a power used not only to grant clemency to
convicted criminal defendants,26 but also to forestall federal criminal
prosecutions.27 Congress has also granted the President authority to appoint
19. See Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-599B (2012)).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . .”).
22. See J. Richard Broughton, Politics, Prosecutors, and the Presidency in the Shadows of
Watergate, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 169–71 (2012). For a discussion of early federal prosecutors’
deference to presidential policy, see Scott Ingram, Representing the United States Government:
Reconceiving the Federal Prosecutor’s Role Through a Historical Lens, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 293 (2017).
23. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,
130 HARV. L. REV. 811 (2017).
24. See, e.g., Eric Posner, A (Very Reluctant) Defense of Trump’s Firing of Comey, ERIC POSNER
BLOG, (May 11, 2017), http://ericposner.com/a-very-reluctant-defense-of-trumps-firing-of-comey/
(“The president is the chief law enforcement officer; he determines law enforcement priorities and
policies.”).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”).
26. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal
Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802 (2015).
27. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1131 (2010) (discussing Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich); Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford,
the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349 (2010) (discussing Ford’s
pardon of President Nixon). As originally understood, it does not appear that the pardon power could be
used preemptively in this manner. See The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 485
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and to discharge the Attorney General who heads the DOJ,28 and this
authority presumably has constitutional origins as well.29 However, the
power to hire and fire does not necessarily imply the power to instruct
subordinate officials how to do their jobs.30
The Court’s characterization of criminal prosecution as an executive
function does not mean that the Executive has exclusive authority in this
area. In our system of checks and balances, the powers of individual
branches are not always exclusive.31 In the criminal context, in particular,
Congress and the Judiciary exercise significant authority to circumscribe
and influence federal prosecutors’ decision-making through procedural
rules and statutes.32 Congress can also inquire into prosecutors’ decisionmaking in individual cases.33 Courts regulate prosecutors not only by
interpreting and enforcing limits imposed by the Constitution, statutes, and
rules, but by adopting rules of professional conduct and court rules
governing the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.34 To be sure, federal
(1831) (opining that the President “can pardon or reprieve only when an offence against the law has
been established by proof or the admissions of the party, and a penalty thereby incurred”).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) (“The Department of Justice is an executive department of the
United States at the seat of Government.”); 28 U.S.C. § 503 (“The President shall appoint, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is
the head of the Department of Justice.”).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments”).
30. See infra notes 224–28 and accompanying text. The conclusion that the President is vested
with “all” executive power involves an inference from the text that is not necessarily accurate. See
Victoria F. Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive
Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2018).
31. As DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel observed in 1973, “there are few areas under the
Constitution to which a single branch of the Government can claim a monopoly.” Memorandum from
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Re: Amenability
of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in
Office 21 (Sept. 24, 1973) (first quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209–10 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); and then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)),
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf.
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1975) (governing production of witness statements and reports);
FED. R. CRIM. P. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 453–57 (2001) (arguing that constitutional history does
not support federal prosecutors’ independence from Congress and the Judiciary in exercising
discretion).
33. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 22; Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial
Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 71 (2016) (discussing congressional inquiry into
prosecution of Aaron Swartz).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying professional
conduct rule to restrict a prosecutor’s investigation); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–75
(1985) (recognizing federal prosecutors’ due process disclose obligation). Federal courts also exercise
limited supervisory authority to regulate prosecutors. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
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courts hesitate to interfere with prosecutors’ charging decisions unless
prosecutors have clearly violated a constitutional provision.35 But, even in
making charging and plea bargaining decisions, federal prosecutors act
under some legislative and judicial constraints.36
Congress and the Judiciary can, directly or indirectly, determine not
only how prosecutors, as executive officials, make prosecutorial decisions,
such as whether to bring or dismiss criminal charges, but also who within
the Executive Branch can serve as a prosecutor and make prosecutorial
decisions in a given case. For example, having vested prosecutorial authority in a law department, Congress might expressly or implicitly determine
that prosecutorial authority must be exercised exclusively by the Attorney
General and subordinates in that department and not by others within the
Executive Branch. Likewise, pursuant to its inherent authority over judicial
proceedings, the federal Judiciary might establish restrictions on the
exercise of prosecutorial authority that have the effect of excluding the
President from certain decision-making. For example, courts might rely on
their supervisory powers or the Due Process clause of the Constitution to
require prosecutorial discretion to be exercised by lawyers who are free of
political influences.37
At present, no federal law or court rule explicitly calls for federal
prosecutors’ independence from the President.38 The concept might be so
embedded in our understanding of criminal justice that both the Executive
and Judiciary have implicitly accepted it in the way that they exercise their
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Redondo–Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992), amended on
denial of reh’g en banc (May 11, 1992), overruled by United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th
Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016); Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of
Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative
Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 166–69 (2016).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo–Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing federal
court’s authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) to deny the government’s motion to dismiss an
indictment).
37. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Court exercised its supervisory
authority to overturn a criminal contempt conviction because the district court appointed the victim’s
lawyer, who was not disinterested, to prosecute. 481 U.S. 787, 804–08 (1987). The Court left open
whether there was a due process right to a disinterested prosecutor, but lower courts have found that
there is, reasoning that prosecutorial discretion must be exercised by someone who is not obligated or
loyal to third parties with interests in the prosecution. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714–15
(4th Cir. 1967). See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 490–91 (2017). One might argue that
presidential control violates the defendant’s right to a disinterested prosecutor, since the President is not
professionally committed to exercising disinterested, politically-nonpartisan discretion.
38. Title 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct
of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General.” The provision is not explicit that the Attorney General and DOJ officers must
“conduct . . . litigation” independently from presidential control.
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powers. Even if not, professional independence may be implicit in the work
of contemporary prosecutors, as the courts and Congress—if not the DOJ—
have come to understand it. The courts and Congress may have constructed
the law around the premise of prosecutorial independence. Is this premise
effectively woven into the fabric of the law, and if so, is it consistent with
the President’s Article II power?
B. The Originalist Argument
There is no clear historical basis on which to build an originalist
argument that presidents have constitutional authority to direct criminal
prosecutions and that Congress lacks authority to vest prosecutorial
decision-making in independent subordinate officers. Early presidents
occasionally directed federal district attorneys to initiate or dismiss prosecutions, but their authority was never tested and other individuals beyond
presidential control also had authority to bring federal criminal prosecutions.
Many scholars who question the legality of internal limits on
presidential power argue that the structure of government at the founding
mandates a unitary Executive with full power residing in the chief
executive.39 Others insist that prosecutors enjoyed a significant degree of
independence in the early years.40 Without embracing the originalist
approach to constitutional meaning, this Part concludes that the evidence
from the early years of the republic is mixed, reflecting, among other
things, a disagreement about the power of the Executive Branch.
Control of criminal prosecutions by a chief executive is not part of this
country’s received tradition: In England, before the American Revolution,
most prosecutions were conducted by private individuals and prosecuting
societies.41 Most colonial prosecutions were similarly initiated by private
individuals.42 To the extent that public prosecutors investigated and
prosecuted criminal cases in the colonies or—following the nation’s
founding—in the states, there is no evidence that gubernatorial control of

39. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11.
40. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989) (“From an early period, Congress limited the
Executive’s effective control over criminal law enforcement ‘affirmatively’ by dispersing supervisory
responsibility among various executive officials.”).
41.
LEON RADZINOWICZ, 2 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 126–28 (1956); J.J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 1700–
1900, at 122–23 (1979).
42. Willliam E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era:
An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 467–68 (1967).
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prosecutors was the norm.43 Today, in most states, public prosecutors are
independently elected and do not answer to the Governor.
In the early days of the republic, federal criminal jurisdiction was
extremely limited. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for presidential
appointment of private attorneys, who came to be called district attorneys,
to prosecute federal criminal cases,44 although an earlier Senate draft called
for judicial appointment of prosecutors.45 Even though prosecutors functioned independently of the Attorney General,46 presidents did, at times,
direct how district attorneys conducted at least certain individual criminal
cases.47 For example, President Washington both ordered the prosecution
of participants in the Whiskey Rebellion and, a year later, ordered that
prosecutions be dropped against two wrongly accused defendants.48
President Adams ordered that prosecutions be filed under the Sedition
Act,49 while President Jefferson, considering the Act unconstitutional,
ordered pending prosecutions to be dismissed.50 Jefferson insisted that
federal prosecutors decline to bring cases under libel laws and took an
active role in the prosecution of his first Vice President, Aaron Burr.51 He
also ordered a Connecticut district attorney to bring a federal common law
criminal case against Federalist printers who had called the President
immoral, but then ordered the district attorney to drop the case when it
became clear that the defendants were planning to put on evidence that
Jefferson seduced a woman.52
Kate Andrias has called attention to an 1831 Attorney General opinion
concluding that President Jackson had authority to direct a federal district
attorney to dismiss a forfeiture action and to return the property in question

43. The public prosecutor’s origin in the colonies has been called a “historical puzzle.” W. Scott
Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 138
(1952) (“[T]he anomalous figure of the public prosecutor in the United States stands out in our AngloAmerican system of criminal law as a historical challenge . . . .”).
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of
the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989
DUKE L.J. 561, 585–86 (1989).
45. Bloch, supra note 44, at 567 & n.24 (discussing the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of
1789).
46. See id. at 585–86.
47. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553 (2005)
(“Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson believed that they had constitutional authority to direct
federal district attorneys. In fact, each directed district attorneys to begin and cease prosecutions
in . . . cases suffused with foreign affairs implications, cases involving the domestic political opposition,
and even cases concerning the nation’s territorial integrity.”).
48. Id. at 553–54.
49. Id. at 559.
50. Id. at 561.
51. Id. at 561–62.
52. R.B. BERNSTEIN, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE REVOLUTION OF IDEAS 189 (2004).
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to the foreign royalty from whom it had been stolen.53 Attorney General
(and future Chief Justice) Roger B. Taney rejected the premise that the
President’s authority derived from the specific power to issue pardons and
reprieves, but derived presidential authority to order the dismissal of
prosecutions from the “Take Care” Clause of Article II. Taney maintained
that it was necessary for the President to have this power, and he described
possible scenarios illustrating the necessity.54 For example, if pirates stole a
foreign sovereign’s property, the President should be able to order a
forfeiture proceeding dismissed and the property returned, since “a
[forfeiture] prosecution on the part of the United States might put to hazard
the peace of the country.”55 And since this power was not specifically
granted by the Constitution in cases of necessity, the opinion reasoned, it
must derive from a general grant of authority that would apply equally
whether the prosecution implicated national or only private interests, as
long as “the public interest or the principles of justice required the
President to act.”56 Likewise, the opinion reasoned, if a district attorney
brought an unjust prosecution to oppress an individual, the most obvious
way for the President to ensure the law’s faithful execution would be to
order the district attorney to dismiss it.57 And in cases of significant importance, a district attorney might hesitate to move to dismiss the case, or a
court might refuse to grant the district attorney’s motion, without the
President’s direction.58
Scholars have debated the constitutional significance of this history.59
Given that early presidents asserted occasional control over individual
prosecutions, Andrias and Prakash argue that the Founders understood that
criminal prosecution is an executive power that a President may choose to
control.60 But early prosecutors never objected or tested the President’s
authority in court, and assuming that the early history reflects presidential
53. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1051–53 (2013)
(discussing The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831)). Although the forfeiture
action was technically a civil action, the opinion did not distinguish between civil and criminal cases.
54. The Jewels of the Princess Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 487 (1831) (“Cases readily suggest
themselves which show the necessity of such a power to enable [the President] to discharge this duty.”).
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 489 (“[S]uch a prosecution would not be a faithful execution of the law; and upon the
President being satisfied that the forms of law were abused for such a purpose, and being bound to take
care that the law was faithfully executed, it would become his duty to take measures to correct the
procedure. And the most natural and proper measure to accomplish that object would be, to order the
district attorney to discontinue the prosecution.”).
58. Id. at 490.
59. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (1994) (arguing that criminal prosecution was not exclusively a federal
executive function).
60. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 53, at 1051–53; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 658–59 (1994).
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authority to control federal prosecutors, one cannot say whether the
authority was implicit in the Constitution or in legislation. Moreover,
others note that, in the early years of the republic, criminal prosecutions
were concurrently conducted by state prosecutors, private persons, and
federal officials who functioned independently of the President, except in
rare cases, which suggests that Congress may, if it chooses, vest prosecutorial authority in subordinate officials who are independent of the
President.61 The early history might suggest an intermediate position.
Although the early presidential involvement in criminal prosecution was
justified as an exercise of authority to “take care” that federal laws are
faithfully exercised,62 most of the reported examples seem to implicate
other presidential powers and, in particular, the power to conduct foreign
affairs.63 One might argue that, rather than possessing plenary authority
over criminal prosecutions, presidents could supersede ordinary prosecutorial independence only in cases where enumerated presidential powers
were implicated.
C. The Contemporary Debate Over Presidential Criminal-Justice
Authority
In modern times, as far as the public record reflects, contemporary U.S.
presidents do not ordinarily seek to control or direct prosecutors’ conduct
of individual federal criminal cases.64 Attorneys general occasionally
61. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 108 (“As we have seen, the framers did not
believe that prosecutorial authority need be concentrated in the President operating through the
Attorney General.”); id. at 118 (“With respect to implementation of the laws, history suggests that the
framers understood Congress to have broad power to structure government arrangements as it saw fit.
Many prosecutors, state as well as federal, were free from the control of the Attorney General and the
President.”); Reisman, supra note 17, at 56–57; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 91 (1983) (observing that “the
Attorney General did not attain centralized control of litigation until the 1860’s, when the Department
of Justice finally was created”); cf. Bloch, supra note 44, at 634 (“The early legislators do not appear to
have been concerned with . . . strong presidential control over the Attorney General.”).
62. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 60, at 553; see also John Yoo, George Washington and the
Executive Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (2010).
63. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 23, at 823 (“[P]articular criminal matters are not directed by the
President personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are
dedicated to serving the public and promoting public safety. The President does not and should not
decide who or what to investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.”
(citing Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2013));
Theodore B. Olson, The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s Stewardship Through the
Example of Rex E. Lee, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 146–47 (Seth Waxman observed that in “cases [that] may
have appeared to the outside world as paradigmatically cases in which we would be hearing from the
White House, or talking to the White House, . . . [no] effort [was] made by any political person to
intrude in our decision-making policy”). Although President Trump has expressed a desire in speeches
and on social media that the DOJ take various actions, as of this writing it does not appear that he has
directly ordered the Attorney General or other DOJ officials to bring or end an investigation or
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consult with the President regarding individual cases.65 But, presidents do
not, as a general matter, tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular
investigations. Nor do they direct federal prosecutors whether charges
against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or how pending
charges should be prosecuted. In general, prosecutors’ discretion to
determine whether or not to pursue criminal charges—whether based on
the extent of the evidence of guilt, on considerations of proportionality, or
on other considerations—is considered to be a defining feature of their
work.66 While there are no universally accepted principles to guide
prosecutorial discretion, there is a consensus that decisions should not take
account of public officials’ self-interest or partisan politics.67
Ever since the 2016 presidential election, the question of who has
power to direct criminal prosecutions has become critical. Responding to
candidate Donald Trump’s call to “lock up” his Democratic rival, Hillary
Clinton, experts considered whether, if elected, Trump could order a
prosecution to be initiated.68 And in connection with discussions of whether
President Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey might have been an
effort to obstruct the federal investigation of the administration’s Russian

prosecution or to take other specific action in a matter. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Crosses a New
Line, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2018, at A14 (discussing President Trump’s Twitter post: “I hereby demand,
and will do so officially tomorrow, that the Department of Justice look into whether or not the FBI/DOJ
infiltrated or surveilled the Trump Campaign for Political Purposes—and if any such demands or
requests were made by people within the Obama Administration!”).
65. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ramsey Clark and the
Selective Non-Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (describing a
meeting at which President Johnson and his cabinet discussed the possibility of bringing conspiracy
charges against black leaders for inciting urban riots).
66. On the origins of federal prosecutorial discretion, see Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 13–26
(2009).
67. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837,
856–59 (2004).
68. Compare, e.g., Roger Parloff, Could a President Donald Trump Prosecute Hillary Clinton?,
FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/10/donald-trump-special-prosecutor-hillaryclinton/ (“[A] President Trump would not have legal authority to direct the Attorney General to appoint
a special prosecutor to ‘look into’ Hillary Clinton’s email situation or the Clinton Foundation or
anything else. That’s not within a President’s power.” (quoting Laurence Tribe)), and id. (“It is essential
that the Department be apolitical with respect to its choice of law enforcement targets and to its exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. And very improper if the president were to be making phone calls to the
attorney general with respect to a particular target of investigation. . . . If it had been revealed to have
happened in the past it would have been a scandal.” (quoting Jim Jacobs)), with FBI Investigators Will
Go Public If Obama’s Attorney General Does Not Indict Hillary Clinton, INFOWARS (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.infowars.com/fbi-investigators-will-go-public-if-obamas-attorney-general-does-not-indicthillary-clinton/ (“The fact is that the president can direct the attorney general not to bring charges. The
attorney general works for the president and the president can order that . . . .” (quoting former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey)); Neal Katyal, Trump or Congress Can Still Block Robert Mueller. I Know.
I Wrote the Rules., WASH. POST POSTEVERYTHING (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2017/05/19/politics-could-still-block-muellers-investigation-i-know-i-wrote-the
rules/?utm_term=.c3108a252ad6.
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ties, several addressed whether the President’s executive authority would
extend to terminating the investigation altogether, were he to so desire.69
Most recently, amidst rumors that the administration may try to discredit
and ultimately order the dismissal of Special Counsel Robert Mueller,
commentators disagree about whether this would amount to a criminal
obstruction of justice, an illegitimate use of his power, or a lawful exercise
of executive power.70
To some experts, it seems obvious that presidents lack authority to
make decisions such as these, and that if the President sought to direct
prosecutors’ conduct of individual criminal cases, the Attorney General and
subordinate officials and prosecutors in the DOJ would have a
responsibility to resist and to exercise independent professional judgment.71
Others, however, think it just as obvious that, as chief executive, presidents
do have this power, even if they have good reason to refrain from using it.72
And yet others regard the question as simply unresolved.73
The question of the President’s authority as chief executive to make
decisions in individual criminal cases arose prominently during the
Watergate investigation. When Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
subpoenaed President Nixon for tapes and documents, the President’s
counsel moved to quash the subpoena, arguing, in part, that the Judiciary
could not compel the President to produce evidence in a federal criminal

69. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Obstruction of Justice: Part 3—The mental state of acting
‘corruptly,’ IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? (July 2, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/02/
obstruction-of-justice-part-3-the-mental-state-of-acting-corruptly (“Although there has arisen a wellunderstood norm that presidents should not directly intervene in criminal investigations or prosecutions,
particularly if the case involves persons close to the president, that is a norm, not a rule. . . . [A]s a
constitutional matter, it would appear that a president has the same authority as the Attorney General,
the FBI Director, or any of their subordinates to decline even a legally meritorious prosecution.”).
70. See Eric Columbus, Could Trump Fire Mueller? It’s Complicated., POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/03/could-trump-fire-mueller-its-complicated-21545
3. Firing the Special Prosecutor is more likely to be perceived as an act of obstruction if prosecutorial
independence forecloses the President from directing criminal investigations and prosecutions.
71. See sources cited supra note 68.
72. See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, The President’s Power to End a Criminal Investigation,
NAT’L REV. (May 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447801/president-trumpprosecutorial-discretion-obstruction-justice-fbi-director-james-comey-criminal-justice-system (“A prudent president will not interfere in law-enforcement decisions. But that is because doing so would be
counterproductive and politically damaging. It would not be unlawful.”). A related argument might be
that, absent a universal commitment to prosecutorial independence, a President can control government
lawyers’ work as a practical matter by hiring an Attorney General whose primary loyalty is to the
Administration. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2471 (2006) (“[B]y his power
of appointment or otherwise, the President can assure that the Attorney General’s and Department of
Justice’s primary fealty is to his administration and not to some abstract view of the law.”).
73. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 22.
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investigation because the President had ultimate control over the conduct of
such investigations.74
The brief for the President began with the uncontroversial principle that
the Attorney General has discretion over whom to charge and control over
other prosecutorial decisions in federal criminal cases.75 The brief then
asserted that the Attorney General’s authority was merely derivative of that
of the President, who has constitutional authority under Article II to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”76 In support, the brief quoted
various federal court decisions that made passing references to the
President as “Chief Magistrate”77 and to the Attorney General as “the
President’s surrogate”78 and “the hand of the president.”79 It follows, the
brief argued, that the President could in theory decide whether or not to
prosecute a particular case, and in a grave enough case, such as one
involving national security, the conduct of foreign policy or an interbranch
dispute, a President might in fact exercise this authority.80 By way of
illustration, the brief cited a Civil War–era decision upholding the
President’s statutory authority to confiscate rebels’ property.81 But the
decision is plainly off point.82
The next month Yale law professor Alexander Bickel published a
74. Reply Brief at 999–1000, In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (Misc. No.
47-73) [hereinafter Reply Brief], reprinted in 9 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
999.
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
77. Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 1001–02 (first quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (14,692); and then quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (14, 694) (Marshall, C.J.)). The characterization in itself does not presuppose that all executive
decision-making authority ultimately resides in the President. For example, President Taft, who
appropriated the phrase for the title of one of his books, wrote that “Executive officers appointed by the
President directly or indirectly are his subordinates, and yet Congress can undoubtedly pass laws
definitely limiting their discretion and commanding a certain course by them which it is not within the
power of the Executive to vary.” WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 125
(1916).
78. Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 1000 (quoting Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246–47
(5th Cir. 1967)).
79. Id. (first quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); and then quoting United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)).
80. Id. (quoting Cox, 342 F.2d at 193).
81. Id. (citing The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873)).
82. The legislation specifically authorized the President to “cause” the seizure and confiscation
of rebels’ property. The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 109. The question for the Court was
whether this required the President personally to order a seizure or whether subordinate officials could
do so pursuant to the President’s authority. The Court held that subordinates presumptively gave orders
pursuant to presidential authority. Nothing in the decision presupposes that Congress was required to
vest authority in the President or that the President would have had authority to make decisions even if
responsibility had specifically been reposed in subordinate officers. Further, the decision has little
bearing on the President’s criminal justice authority, since the Court specifically recognized that the
statutory authority in issue was not a criminal-justice power, see id. at 104 (“They are in no sense
criminal proceedings. . . .”), and that the confiscation power grew out of the state of war, id. at 109.
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magazine article endorsing the President’s counsel’s assumption that the
President had authority to direct criminal prosecutors.83 At around the same
time, the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) did so as well, in an
opinion on whether federal officials, including the President, could be
criminally prosecuted while in office.84 In concluding that a sitting
President could not be prosecuted, the opinion observed that the federal
prosecution of a sitting president would seem inconsistent with the President’s constitutional status as chief criminal law enforcement administrator.85 The opinion observed that “the Attorney General . . . serves at the
pleasure and [is] normally subject to the direction of the President and the
pardoning power vested in the President” and that one could therefore
argue “that a President’s status as defendant in a criminal case would be
repugnant to his office of Chief Executive, which includes the power to
oversee prosecutions.”86 The opinion cited the President’s earlier brief and
expressly referred to the cases it cited,87 leaving the clear impression that
the Office was not offering an objective opinion, but was putting a heavy
thumb on the scale on the side of the sitting President’s interest and his
personal counsel’s prior arguments.88
In October 1973, in what came to be known as the “Saturday Night
Massacre,” Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox resisted President Nixon’s
instruction to withdraw the subpoena served on him. When the President
instructed Attorney General Elliott Richardson and Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus to fire Cox, each resigned in turn rather than
comply. Solicitor General Robert Bork, who then became acting Attorney
General, carried out President Nixon’s instruction.89 Bork had evidently
concluded, contrary to Richardson and Ruckelshaus, either that the
President had legal authority to fire Cox or that the President had legal

83. Alexander M. Bickel, The Tapes, Cox, Nixon, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1973, at 13–14.
84. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Dep’t of Justice, Re: Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Fed.
Criminal Prosecution While in Office 26 (Sept. 24, 1973).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. OLC claims to provide “advice based on its best understanding of what the law requires—not
simply an advocate’s defense of the contemplated action or position proposed by an agency or the
Administration.” Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice to Att’ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice & Written
Opinions 1 (Jul. 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf. OLC’s 2002
“torture memos” prompted skepticism. See, e.g., Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory Responsibility for the
Office of Legal Counsel, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 269, 277–81 (2012) (describing the memos’
questionable reasoning).
89. See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A01.
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authority to direct the Acting Attorney General to do so.90 He later
defended his choice based on an institutional interest in preserving a
functioning DOJ.91
Leon Jaworski, whom Bork appointed to continue the Watergate
investigation, followed Cox’s lead by subpoenaing President Nixon. When
the Supreme Court heard the case in United States v. Nixon,92 the principal
question was whether the items were protected from disclosure by executive privilege. President Nixon, however, also questioned the Special
Prosecutor’s authority to issue the grand jury subpoena, and in that context,
asserted the President’s authority over federal criminal law enforcement.
His brief argued that a federal prosecutor could not issue a subpoena
against the President’s will because the President has complete control over
federal criminal investigations.93 The Special Prosecutor countered that his
appointment, pursuant to an arrangement established by the Executive
Branch, eliminated whatever authority the President might otherwise have
had to direct this particular criminal investigation.94 However, the Special
Prosecutor also questioned the DOJ’s assertion that the President generally
could control the conduct of individual federal criminal cases.95 Jaworski’s
brief pointed out that prosecutors “have duties and responsibilities owed to
the courts,” and quoted from the Court’s opinion in Berger v. United
States96 describing federal prosecutors’ obligation to seek justice, which, it
argued, was incompatible with presidential direction of prosecutorial
discretion.97 In unanimously upholding the subpoena, the Court acknowledged the President’s claim to have control of all federal criminal

90. Bork later defended the lawfulness of his conduct, but it is hard to reconstruct his thinking at
the time. There is some indication that the Justice Department thought that President Nixon had
authority to fire Cox. See Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 1987) (quoting Elliot Richardson), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/02/us/bork-irkedby-emphasis-on-his-role-in-watergate.html. But there is also an indication that Bork believed the
President had the right to fire Cox because Cox wrongfully defied the President’s direction to dismiss
the subpoena. See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals, N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 1987) (quoting Richardson), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/us/new-viewsemerge-of-bork-s-role-in-watergate-dismissals.html?pagewanted=all.
91. Noble, supra note 90.
92. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
93. Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834), 1974 WL 174855, at *97
(“Since the President’s powers include control over all federal prosecutions, it is hardly reasonable or
sensible to consider the President subject to such [federal criminal] prosecution.”).
94. Reply Brief for the United States, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73–
1766, 73–1834), 1973 WL 159436 at *37–40 [hereinafter U.S. Reply Brief].
95. Id. at *38 n.21.
96. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
97. U.S. Reply Brief, supra note 94, at *38 n.21 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88).
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prosecutions,98 but did not endorse it. The Court found that as long as the
regulation authorizing the Special Prosecutor to act independently was
extant, it had the force of law.99 It did not matter that the Attorney General
could repeal the law because he had not done so.100 The Court did not
comment on whether, but for the delegation of authority, the President
could have directed the prosecutor to withdraw his subpoena.101
This unresolved debate was recalled a quarter century later in the
context of Independent Counsel Ken Starr’s investigation of President
Clinton.102 In 2000, the OLC reconsidered and reaffirmed its 1973
memorandum, concluding that a sitting president could not be indicted and
noting its earlier views regarding the President’s law-enforcement role.103
In 1981 and 1982, in congressional hearings on whether to renew the
special prosecutor law, Rudolph Giuliani, on behalf of the DOJ, maintained
that the law was at odds with presidential authority to control federal
criminal prosecutions.104 The question of presidential control of criminal
prosecutions was posed again, albeit more vaguely, in 2007, when the
second President Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, fired several
United States Attorneys at once, ostensibly in order to promote the
Administration’s criminal-justice policy.105 The vagueness of the
explanation raised questions about whether some of the prosecutors were
fired because of their refusal to accede to the White House’s direction in
specific cases, and this in turn led to discussion of whether the President
had legal authority to give such direction.106
98. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693 (noting that the President argued that he had absolute authority to
decide what evidence can be used in a federal criminal case, and therefore the issue before the Court
was nonjusticiable).
99. Id. at 695.
100. Id. at 694–96.
101. Id. at 692–97 (concluding that the Executive Branch was bound by an Attorney General
regulation giving the Special Prosecutor authority to prosecute on behalf of the United States).
102. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; A Primer: Prosecuting the President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
25,
1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/25/weekinreview/the-nation-a-primer-prosecuting-apresident.html. The issue arose during discussions of whether a sitting president could be indicted and
prosecuted on federal charges. If the President controls the DOJ, it might seem anomalous for the DOJ
to prosecute a sitting president. However, scholarly debate over whether a sitting president can be
prosecuted has largely ignored this argument. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The
Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution (1997), in FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 940,
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/940/; Eric M. Freedman, On Protecting Accountability,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (1999).
103. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C.
222 (2000).
104. Tiefer, supra note 61, at 61 n.13, 92 n.162 (citing Giuliani’s congressional testimony).
105. See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Justice Department Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007).
106. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707
(2008) (arguing for DOJ independence based on the theory that the “take care” clause does not establish
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Notwithstanding the DOJ’s official position, Attorney General
nominees since Watergate have endorsed the principle of prosecutorial
independence from the President,107 and Senators have regarded a commitment to independence from the President as an essential qualification
for the position.108 DOJ officials assume that prosecutorial decisions should
not be influenced by partisan political considerations that may motivate the
White House.109 Internal DOJ policy likewise presupposes that prosecutors
should be independent. Recognizing that prosecutors “must be insulated
from influences that should not affect decisions in particular criminal . . . cases,”110 a 2009 Attorney General memorandum narrowly
circumscribed communications between DOJ officials and the White
House about “pending or contemplated criminal investigations or cases.”111
Earlier memoranda came to similar conclusions.112 But attorneys general
have not promised that the President will be shut out of prosecutorial
decision-making in individual criminal cases or that DOJ officials should
risk being fired rather than follow the President’s commands.
the President’s right to control subordinate executive-branch officials but only reposes a duty in the
President).
107. See, e.g., Nomination of Janet Reno to Be the Attorney General of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 47, 64–65 (1993) (Reno acknowledged
being impressed with how a prosecution proceeded without any White House influence); Confirmation
Hearing on William French Smith, Nominee, to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 17, 34–35 (1981) (Smith acknowledged the importance of maintaining the
DOJ’s independence from the administration); Nomination of Edward H. Levi to Be Attorney General
of the U.S.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 23 (1975) (Levi: “I’m going to
call them as I see them. I cannot imagine why anyone, including the President of the United States,
would think of asking me to take this office, if I am confirmed, except for my independent judgment as
to the legality, which includes frequently a judgment as to the kinds of policies which are involved in
the legality, and I would give my independent judgment.”).
108. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments—William P. Barr: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2 (1991) (Sen. Biden: “[W]hile working to serve the
President, the Attorney General has the unique responsibility to the public that requires him to maintain
independence from the President’s personal and political interests.”); see also Jack M. Beermann, The
Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1614 (2018)
(observing that “politically there seems to be a strong consensus rejecting [the] premise that the
President should have control over investigations and prosecutions of executive branch officials” and
that “[t]here is a long tradition of Justice Department independence from direct presidential
supervision”).
109. This premise follows not only from principles of prosecutorial independence but also from
the rules governing attorney conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016); see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 484–88.
110. Memorandum from the U.S. Att’y Gen. Eric Holder on Commc’ns with the White House &
Cong. 1 (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia/library/communications_with_the_white_
house_and_congress_2009.pdf /download.
111. Id. at 2 (providing that, with the exception of criminal investigations relating to national
security matters such as counter-terrorism and counter-espionage, initial communications “will involve
only the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General” on the DOJ’s side).
112. See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. Benjamin R. Civiletti on Commc’n from the
White House & Cong. To Heads of Offices, Bds., Bureaus, & Divs. 1 (Oct. 18, 1979) (reaffirming the
principles previously announced by Attorney General Griffin Bell).
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D. The Constitutional Arguments Regarding Presidential Authority
Leading up to Morrison v. Olson, several arguments were made that
the Constitution authorizes the President to direct how federal prosecutors
conduct criminal prosecutions. This Article has already addressed
originalist arguments based on the early presidential history.113 This
Subpart addresses three additional arguments that are equally unpersuasive:
(1) the President’s executive authority, including the authority to fire the
Attorney General, necessarily implies the power to direct how the Attorney
General and other subordinate DOJ officials do their work; (2) the
President’s explicit pardon power is merely illustrative and implies a
general authority to direct how prosecutorial decisions are made; and (3)
the nature of federal criminal prosecution necessitates presidential
involvement.
1. Presidential Control
The principal arguments for presidential authority to direct decisionmaking in individual criminal cases were offered in the President’s
Watergate briefs, the OLC memoranda, and Bickel’s article: (a) criminal
prosecution is an executive function; (b) decision-making by the Attorney
General and subordinate DOJ officials derives from the President as chief
executive; and (c) the power to “take care” that the criminal law is
faithfully executed implies not only the power to fire prosecutorial officials
who fail to carry out their responsibilities but the power to direct how they
exercise their responsibilities.
These arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. Most
importantly, the fact that the Constitution vests executive authority in the
President and directs the President to “take care” that the law is faithfully
executed does not invariably mean that the President has the power to
direct subordinates’ actions. While the President ordinarily acts through
subordinate officials,114 it does not necessarily follow that all subordinate
officials are subject to the President’s direction.115 The DOJ itself
recognized, in a 1937 opinion, that “when a statutory duty devolves
primarily upon an officer other than the President, the latter’s sole
obligation is to see that the officer performs such duty or to replace him”
and that the President’s authority does not extend to correcting the

113. See supra Subparts I.A & I.B.
114. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“In
most instances, the President speaks and acts through lower governmental officials.”).
115. Nourse, supra note 30, at 22–24.
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subordinates’ ostensible misjudgments.116
To support this understanding, the 1937 opinion relied extensively on
the lower court and Supreme Court opinions in Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes,117 involving the Postmaster General’s refusal to perform a
ministerial act required by federal legislation—namely, to credit individuals with amounts that the Solicitor of the Treasury determined they were
owed. In this case, the Postmaster General credited mail deliverers with
only part of what they were found to be owed, and even when the President
directed him to make complete payment, he declined. In reviewing the
petitioners’ application for an order requiring full payment, the Court
considered whether the President had authority to direct the Postmaster
General to do his duty. The Court concluded that Congress could repose
authority in Executive Branch officials to act independently of the
President—that is, to answer to the law, not the President.118 The Court
explained that the President cannot direct every executive officer:
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the
President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which
is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution;
and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this
is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial
character.119

The Court in Kendall made clear that executive officials must fulfill their
duties in accordance with their understanding of the law, not the
President’s orders.
Kendall is not obscure, forgotten, or discredited. Although it is most
often cited for other points, neither the Court nor Congress has questioned
its interpretation of presidential power or otherwise repudiated the general
principle that Congress may authorize subordinate executive officials to act
independently of the President. On the contrary, a 1973 congressional
opinion recognized that Kendall “suggest[s] that the President may not
intervene to defeat the execution of statutory duties vested in other Federal

116. Presidential Auth. to Direct Dep’ts & Agencies to Withhold Expenditures from
Appropriations Made, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 12, 12–14 (1937) (first quoting The President & Accounting
Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625–26 (1823); then quoting Power of the President Respecting Pension
Cases, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846); and then quoting Eight-Hour Law, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 685,
686–87 (1890)).
117. Id. at 14–15 (quoting Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610
(1838), aff’g 26 F. Cas. 702, 752–754 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517)).
118. United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 754 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517).
119. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610.
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officials.”120 President Nixon’s Watergate briefs, as works of advocacy,
understandably ignored this authority, but so did the OLC’s 1973 and 2000
memoranda in favor of an argument made by the President in a case where
the Court ultimately ruled against him. The omission raises doubts about
the reliability of the OLC’s understandings forged in the crucible of
Watergate.
One might argue about whether Kendall reflects the Framers’ original
understanding,121 or read Kendall to apply only where subordinate executive officials perform ministerial tasks, not, as in the case of criminal
prosecution, when they exercise discretion. But by the mid-twentieth
century, with the rise of the administrative state, these ships had sailed: the
idea of a unitary Executive, in which all executive power vests in the
President, had been soundly rejected by the courts and Congress.122
Although politicians and scholars, beginning in the 1980s, renewed the call
for a presidency with full power over all executive function,123 they have
not persuaded the federal Judiciary.
The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the President’s power to
fire a subordinate official implies the power to specifically direct that
official’s decision-making. While the President’s constitutional responsibility to “take care” that the law is faithfully executed presupposes the
power to hire and fire certain federal officials,124 it does not necessarily

120. Letter from U.S. Comp. Gen. Elmer B. Staats on the Legality of Exec. Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds to Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, at 28 (July 26, 1973), 1974 WL 8731.
121. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 60, at 663 (1994) (“[S]ince the President’s
grant of ‘the executive Power’ is exclusive, Congress may not create other entities independent of the
President and let them exercise his ‘executive Power.’”), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 41
(“We believe that the framers wanted to constitutionalize just some of the array of power a constitutionmaker must allocate, and as for the rest, the framers intended Congress (and posterity) to control as it
saw fit.”).
122. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 97–98; id. at 106–07 (“[T]he constitutional assault
on independent administration, at least in its broadest forms, has been decisively repudiated.”); Tiefer,
supra note 61, at 103 (“[O]utside the areas of ‘political’ activity where officers in a strict chain of
command carry out the President’s directions, Congress has utilized its powers to create a variety of
bodies, some independent, some partly independent, some exercising delegated congressional
investigative authority, and some enforcing the laws . . . .”).
123. The renewed call for a unitary Executive corresponds with the birth of originalism, the
theory that the Constitution’s meaning was set when it was drafted, which justifies ignoring or
minimizing subsequent developments. See generally LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, WHAT IS ORIGINALISM?: A
HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY ORIGINALIST THEORY (2011); THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). For
a critique of originalism, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Nourse, supra note 30;
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015).
For a critique of originalism in the context of presidential control over law enforcement, see Reisman,
supra note 17, at 56–57.
124. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (questioning whether
“meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove”). But see Wiener
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follow that the President can tell those officials what to do. Chief Justice
Taft made this point in Myers v. United States,125 striking down a statute
denying the President power to fire the Postmaster General. Taft’s opinion
recognized that the President can direct the conduct of some executive
employees,126 but not necessarily all:
[T]here may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the
President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be duties of a quasijudicial character imposed on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case
properly influence or control.127

These federal officials may be subject to removal by the President for
performing their work incompetently, but not to the President’s
direction.128
Given the nature of criminal law enforcement, Myers suggests that
Congress can, and almost certainly should, put prosecutors’ day-to-day
work beyond presidential control. Decisions about whether to initiate
investigations, whether to ask a grand jury to indict, whether to dismiss
charges or offer a plea bargain, whether to provide immunity in exchange
for testimony, what sentence to recommend, and the like, are all
discretionary, not ministerial. These decisions affect individual interests—
indeed, individuals’ liberty interest. In making these decisions, prosecutors’
offices have been compared to administrative agencies.129 And the
prosecutors’ work has long been described as “quasi-judicial”: in
exercising discretion, prosecutors are expected to pursue “justice,”
independent of partisan politics.130

v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (upholding statute denying the President’s authority to remove a
member of the War Claims Commission).
125. 272 U.S. 52 (1926), overruled in part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935).
126. Id. at 135 (“The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general
administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and
he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to
secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently
contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117 (1998).
130. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 839, 869–70.
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2. Pardon Power
One might argue that the presidential pardon power is not exceptional
but was meant to illustrate the President’s ordinary power over federal
criminal law enforcement. But even Roger Taney, a proponent of
presidential authority over federal criminal law enforcement, declined to
read this authority into the pardon power.131 Further, the only evidence in
the constitutional debates is apparently to the contrary.132 If the Framers
meant to ensure that presidents would have ultimate authority over criminal
prosecutions, one might expect them to have given a more explicit sign, as
they did with the war powers and other enumerated presidential powers.
The presidential pardon power, like the executive clemency power of
state governors, is more easily understood as distinct from the work of
criminal prosecution. Although criminal prosecutors may decline to bring
charges against individuals who violated the criminal law, the crux of their
work involves determining whether the evidence establishes guilt. While a
pardon may be issued to correct a miscarriage of justice, the traditional use
is to render mercy—to free a guilty person from prison. A constitutional
preference for assigning this authority to the President does not presuppose
that the Framers meant the President to control criminal prosecution in its
entirety. Just as plausibly, the pardon was meant as a small, exceptional
check on prosecutors’ work.133
Though a president can now pardon someone even before charges are
brought, it does not follow that the President can achieve comparable
results by directing prosecutors to refrain from bringing charges or to move
to dismiss charges.134 The pardon power is circumscribed.135 Presidential
influence on prosecutors’ charging decisions would not necessarily be
evident, whereas a pardon entails a public proclamation, making the
President accountable for his decision.136 Many believe that President Ford
131. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
132. See Reply Brief of Appellant Alexia Morrison at 22–23, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1987) (No. 87-1279) (“In the debates of the National Convention, of the ratifying conventions, and in
contemporary comments, including The Federalist, we have come across no reference to the Chief
Executive controlling the prosecutors. On the contrary, the objections to the pardon power as potentially
shielding the guilty confederates of the President suggest that at least some of the Framers thought he
could not accomplish the same end merely by directing the government’s attorney.”) (citing 3 YALE
UNIV., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
133. See Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v.
Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1078–80 (1990) (“Both the colonial heritage and the
Framers’ discussions of the pardon power show that the Founding Fathers did not intend that the
President use his pardon power to achieve unfettered prosecutorial discretion.”).
134. See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
698–700 (2014) (distinguishing clemency from non-enforcement).
135. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 21.
136. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1665, 1702 (2001).
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lost to Jimmy Carter because of the unpopularity of his pardon of Richard
Nixon. Likewise, one could expect political fallout if President Trump were
to pardon campaign aides, family members, or other associates who came
within the ambit of a federal criminal investigation. Concern about political
consequences serves as a check on the abuse of the pardon power.137
Limiting presidential authority in the criminal arena to public acts promotes
accountability and curbs abuse.
Even more obviously, the power to relieve someone of a conviction
through a presidential pardon does not imply the power to achieve a very
different end by directing prosecutors to initiate criminal charges. The
Framers may not have worried about presidents abusing clemency. But, the
harm is much greater if, out of partisanship or other improper motivations,
presidents initiate prosecutions. Prosecuting political foes is worse than
pardoning political allies.
3. Necessity
As previously described, Roger Taney considered it necessary for the
President to be able to control criminal prosecutions because some criminal
cases implicate foreign affairs, the war power, or other federal policy on
which the President has ultimate constitutional authority.138 Further, as
discussed, the early instances in which presidents intervened in individual
criminal cases, in fact, for the most part implicated international
considerations. Especially with the expansion of federal criminal law, few
federal cases implicate international or military concerns. It does not follow
that the Constitution authorizes the President to control all federal criminal
cases because there is a plausible presidential interest in a few.
Even when a president might legitimately take an interest, there is no
constitutional necessity for him to make the ultimate call. The alternative is
for the President to make his views known to the Attorney General. In a
case involving foreign affairs, for example, the Attorney General might
consult with the President, others in the Administration, or both, and
consider the broader implications of a criminal case and others’
preferences. But the Attorney General might still have the last word to
ensure that decision-making is consistent with criminal justice policy and
not only with foreign or other national policy.
Lonnie Brown has discussed an example from Lyndon Johnson’s
administration.139 President Johnson and his cabinet pressured Attorney
137. Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is Our
Cynicism Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 188 (1999) (“A President seeking reelection has a strong
disincentive to grant pardons that would be perceived as attempts to hide information.”).
138. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
139. Brown, supra note 65.
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General Ramsay Clark to prosecute black activists for conspiring to incite
urban riots, based on their public addresses. Clark resisted, apparently
believing that pursuing a prosecution would be a misuse of prosecutorial
discretion in light of DOJ policies and traditions. It is doubtful that the
President and the rest of the cabinet would be equally faithful to the DOJ’s
policies and traditions. Clark’s assertion of ultimate decision-making
responsibility ensured that, while other policy considerations would be
weighed, criminal-justice considerations would have their due.
The necessity argument also overlooks that the Constitution reserves
most criminal enforcement power to the states, with the result that most
criminal cases are, and always have been, brought in state court. State
criminal cases, over which the President has no power, are as likely as
federal ones to implicate foreign policy and other national policy.140 If
presidential control is not a constitutional necessity in state criminal cases,
there is no reason why it would be in federal cases. Finally, the necessity
argument ignores countervailing policy considerations, addressed in Part
III.
E. Morrison v. Olson
The Supreme Court decision in Morrison v. Olson141 strongly suggests
that Congress may authorize federal prosecutors to act independently of the
President’s direction in exercising discretion in particular cases.
Thirty years ago, in Morrison, the Supreme Court upheld a federal
statutory scheme that explicitly established certain federal prosecutors’
independence from the control of the Attorney General and the President.
The special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978
provided that, on application of the Attorney General, a judicial panel could
appoint a lawyer as Special Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute federal
crimes by certain high-ranking federal officials.142 The Independent
Counsel had all the investigative and prosecutorial power of the DOJ and
the Attorney General; was subject to DOJ policies wherever possible; and
could be removed by the Attorney General only for good cause, physical
disability, mental incapacity, or a similar condition that impaired her
performance.143 Olson, a subject of Independent Counsel Morrison’s
investigation, moved to quash a subpoena on the ground that the Act was
unconstitutional. The Court rejected Olson’s constitutional challenge.144
140. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337–40 (2006) (addressing the
admissibility of statements taken in violation of an international treaty requiring consular notification).
141. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
142. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (2012)).
143. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (describing the independent counsel provisions).
144. Id. at 665–68 (describing the case’s factual background).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejected Olson’s argument
that all executive power, including federal prosecutorial power, “is vested
in a unitary President required to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed.”145 Only Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, adopted this argument.146 The Court took it for granted that executive power is not unitary—
that officials wielding executive power could be authorized to act
independently of presidential control.147
The Court focused on whether limiting the President’s grounds for
discharging independent prosecutors unduly encroached on the President’s
power to “take care” that the law is faithfully executed. The Court relied on
two earlier Supreme Court decisions: the 1935 decision in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States,148 upholding a statute that limited presidential
power to discharge FTC commissioners to cases of inefficiency,
malfeasance, and neglect, and the 1958 decision in Wiener v. United
States,149 holding that the President did not have authority to fire members
of a War Crimes Commission at will.150 The Court disagreed with Justice
Scalia’s assertion that Congress could make executive officials independent
from presidential control only when they performed quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions, as in the two prior cases.151 While “there are some
‘purely executive’ officials who must be removable by the President at will
if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role,” said the Court,
independent prosecutors are not among them because they have “limited

145. Brief of Appellee Theodore B. Olson, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 871279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 983, at *37. This was also the Government’s primary argument
as amicus curiae. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 82-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 980, at *16–34.
146. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s
reasoning, see Nourse, supra note 30, at 23 (arguing that Justice Scalia “enriches” the text by reading
the word “all” into executive power).
147. As the Senate’s amicus brief in Morrison pointed out, since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court has recognized Congress’s power to establish Executive Branch officers
who answer to the law, not the President, because their duties are not political and implicate individual
rights. Brief of U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 82-1279),
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 982, at *27–28 (first citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166; and then
citing Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838)); see also Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (“[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he
is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law.”); Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610
(rejecting the premise “that every [Executive Branch] officer. . . is under the exclusive direction of the
President,” and observing that Congress may assign executive duties that “grow out of and are subject
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”).
148. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
149. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
150. Id. at 356.
151. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687–93.
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jurisdiction and tenure and lack[] policymaking or significant administrative authority.”152
The Court acknowledged that an independent counsel “exercises no
small amount of discretion and judgment in deciding how to carry out his
or her duties under the Act,” but did not regard “the President’s need to
control the exercise of that discretion [as being] so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”153
Presidential responsibility to ensure that the Independent Counsel performed competently was sufficiently exercised through the indirect power
(through the Attorney General) to fire the Independent Counsel for
cause.154 In other words, Article II power does not imply the power to
terminate all subordinate officers, much less to direct their conduct.
Subordinate executive officials—except for those in “policymaking or
significant administrative authority”155—may be given independence from
presidential direction and control as long as the President retains direct or
indirect authority to fire them for good reasons, such as incompetence or
malfeasance.
Further, the Court found that the independent counsel provisions did
not violate separation-of-powers principles as a whole by encroaching on
presidential authority.156 The Court emphasized that the law did not remove
significant power from the Executive to Congress or to the Judiciary, which
could not control the independent counsel’s work.157 Congress simply
moved power from one place in the Executive Branch to another.158
Finally, the Court dismissed an argument, most fully elaborated in an
amicus brief on behalf of three former Attorneys General,159 that the statute
isolated the Independent Counsel from the Executive Branch, and particularly from the DOJ, with its institutional wisdom, experience, traditions,
and other checks. The Court observed that the Independent Counsel was
appointed only upon application by the Attorney General, was subject to
discharge for cause by the Attorney General, and was obligated to follow

152. Id. at 690–91.
153. Id. at 691.
154. Id. at 692, 695–96.
155. Id. at 691.
156. Id. at 693–95.
157. Id. at 693–97.
158. Id. at 694–95.
159. Brief for Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, & William French Smith as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellees, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 981, at *28–32. The brief suggested other “ways to protect the independence of a criminal
investigation from political interference,” such as by establishing a special prosecutor with a fixed term
covering different presidential administrations. Id. at *42.
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DOJ policy where possible,160 and it concluded that “these features of the
Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent
counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties.”161
Along the way, the Court rejected Justice Scalia’s assumption that
federal prosecution by its nature was not just an executive power but also a
presidential power.162 Justice Scalia wrote that “[a]lmost all investigative
and prosecutorial decisions—including the ultimate decision whether, after
a technical violation of the law has been found, prosecution is warranted—
involve the balancing of innumerable legal and practical considerations,”
and gave as examples situations involving subpoenaing a former ambassador and whether to use classified information in a prosecution.163 He
concluded that “the balancing of various legal, practical, and political
considerations, none of which is absolute, is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion,” and that “[t]o take this away is to remove the core of
the prosecutorial function, and not merely ‘some’ presidential control.”164
The Court did not dispute Justice Scalia’s description of prosecutorial
decision-making, but nevertheless considered it inessential for the President
to be the ultimate arbiter, even on occasions when nonpartisan political
considerations and foreign policy considerations were implicated. The
Court was satisfied that Congress could delegate this type of executive
decision-making to court-appointed lawyers governed by DOJ policy and
subject to termination for incompetence.
Morrison strongly suggests that Congress can make any or all federal
prosecutors independent from presidential direction.165 The Court did not
consider federal prosecutorial decision-making a core presidential function,
160. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696. A century earlier, United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886),
established Congress’s authority to limit the grounds on which the President may discharge certain
subordinate officials.
161. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 707–708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 707–08.
165. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 110 (“[A]fter Morrison v. Olson, execution
of the laws can be split off from the President if the splitting does not prevent the President from
performing his ‘constitutionally appointed functions.’” (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685)). An earlier
example was the establishment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal. Act of
Feb. 8, 1924, ch. 16, 43 Stat. 5, 5–6 (1924). In recent years, many scholars have been sympathetic to
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison. See, e.g., Counsels and the Separation of Powers, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar), https://www.jud
iciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Amar%20Testimony.pdf (asserting that “[t]he lion’s
share of the constitutional law scholars who are most expert and most surefooted on this particular topic
now believe that Morrison was wrongly decided and/or that the case is no longer ‘good law’ that can be
relied upon as a sturdy guidepost to what the current Court would and should do”). But many others are
less so, and the fact remains that, whatever individual Justices may have said before being confirmed,
the Supreme Court itself has not given any indication that it would reexamine Morrison or that the
Court’s decision in Morrison is not good law.

1 GREEN-ROIPHE-1-76 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/17/2018 10:59 AM

Can the President Control the Department of Justice?

33

one that Congress cannot place elsewhere in the Executive Branch—and
little wonder, since modern presidents rarely seek to assert this power, and
as we discuss below, the tradition of prosecutorial independence has grown
into a permanent feature of American government. Given that understanding, Congress could presumably create a corps of federal prosecutors
hired and subject to firing by the Attorney General, but not otherwise
subject to the Attorney General’s direction or the centralized control of the
DOJ or, indirectly, the President. Nothing in Morrison suggests why
Congress could not just as legitimately establish independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute crimes other than those by high-ranking federal
officials.
The harder question is whether Congress has in fact required or
authorized federal prosecutors to ignore presidential direction and, if not,
whether that expectation has some other legal basis. Or, put differently, the
question is whether the law regulating federal prosecutorial decisionmaking presupposes that prosecutors will not defer to third parties’
direction, not even to that of the President. In past confirmation hearings,
some senators and attorney general nominees seemingly assumed that the
Attorney General may not defer to the President in individual criminal
cases, but the source of that assumption is unclear.
Morrison involved a statute that explicitly removed the Independent
Counsel from the direction of the President or the Attorney General. The
statutory scheme establishing the Attorney General, the DOJ, United States
Attorneys, and subordinate federal prosecutors is quite different. It does not
expressly authorize or require the Attorney General or lower-ranked
prosecutors to make decisions independently of the President. That the
Attorney General serves at the will of the President might be taken to mean
that the Attorney General must follow the President’s lawful directions not
only as to certain matters, such as those involving broad policy, but as to all
matters, including the conduct of individual criminal prosecutions and
investigations and civil lawsuits. That United States Attorneys serve at the
will of the Attorney General, and lower ranked federal prosecutors serve
subject to supervision of United States Attorneys or higher ranked DOJ
officials, might imply that they must follow all lawful directions of the
Attorney General, including those originating with the President.
On the other hand, requiring the Attorney General to ignore presidential directions regarding specific criminal cases, and to insulate lowerlevel prosecutors from presidential influence in such cases, would be a
modest delegation of executive power as compared with the independent
counsel provisions that the Court upheld. Prosecutions would remain under
DOJ control, unlike those conducted by independent counsel, pursuant to
the Ethics in Government Act. And, prosecutorial independence from the
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President would largely accord with contemporary practice and expectations.
The Morrison Court had no reason to determine how prosecutorial
power is allocated within the Executive Branch as a general matter. Any
hints Morrison may have dropped are of little significance thirty years
later, given that none of the Justices who decided Morrison are still active
members of the Court.166 And, while Congress ultimately allowed the independent counsel provisions to sunset, that was not an endorsement of
Justice Scalia’s dissenting view that the President should have the last word
on criminal prosecutions generally, much less in cases involving Executive
Branch officials. At most, it reflected confidence that career prosecutors or
special prosecutors appointed by the DOJ could perform this work as
independently as court-appointed counsel.
F. Concluding Thoughts
There is a scholarly debate over the extent of presidential authority in
the administrative state: which non-enumerated powers must, as a constitutional matter, remain within the President’s control and which may be
allocated to lesser officials, subject only to presidential oversight and
dismissal power.167 This Article does not enter that debate as a general
matter, but focuses on the specific question of whether federal criminal
prosecution is vested in the President. After Morrison, we think it is hard to
argue that the Constitution necessarily assigns criminal law enforcement
authority to the President. Although prosecution is an executive power,
Congress may delegate certain executive powers to federal officers who act
independently of the President—who, although subject to termination by
the President or the Attorney General, are required to make legal decisions
on their own. As the independent counsel provisions illustrated, prosecutors
may be asked to answer to the law, not the President.
The difficult question is the statutory one—whether Congress has
authorized the President to direct federal prosecutions or, alternatively, has
authorized the Attorney General and subordinate federal prosecutors to do
so independently of the President.168 The question, which was largely
academic from the Ford through Obama administrations, is critical now

166. Justice Kennedy, having recently joined the Court, did not participate in the decision.
167. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59.
168. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1968–69 (2008) (inquiring, given that “centralized control and
political influence were equally significant factors” in attorneys generals’ failings, “What then are we to
make of the fact that no major structural guarantees of independence have been implemented in the
office of the Attorney General?”).
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because of reports that the current President has attempted, or at least might
attempt, to direct the Attorney General to bring charges against a political
foe or to drop an investigation or charge against a political ally or personal
associate.169 Should this occur, the Attorney General or a subordinate
prosecutor would have to decide whether there is a legal obligation to
comply or, alternatively, to exercise prosecutorial discretion without regard
to presidential direction. A federal court might conceivably confront the
question if, for example, a subordinate prosecutor challenges adverse
employment action for disobeying a presidential directive, or a defendant
moves to dismiss criminal charges brought in obedience to a presidential
directive. A federal court might also determine how prosecutorial authority
is allocated within the federal Executive Branch in the course of resolving
another legal question, such as whether presidential interference in a
criminal case might comprise obstruction of justice, or whether a sitting
president can be indicted.
The statutory-interpretation question essentially has two parts—
whether the Attorney General can direct the conduct of subordinate
prosecutors, and if so, whether the President can dictate how the Attorney
General conducts criminal prosecutions or directs subordinate prosecutors.
The relevant legislation provides no explicit answer to the second part of
the question.
As to the first part, federal law reserves the conduct of litigation,
including criminal prosecutions, to “officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney General,” except where the law
provides otherwise.170 This is conventionally taken to mean that United
States Attorneys and other subordinate DOJ lawyers are, in theory, subject
to the Attorney General’s specific direction,171 although, as a practical
matter, subordinate prosecutors maintain substantial autonomy: it would be
a rare criminal case where, consistent with DOJ policy, an attorney general
made the ultimate decision. It should be noted, however, that the current
regime of attorney general control, sparingly exercised, was not always the
understanding, and owes something to historic practice. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 gave the Attorney General no control or direction over federal
prosecutors.172 Federal prosecutors (then “district attorneys”) were first
169. See supra notes 4–5.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012); see also supra note 38 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 516). Section 519
provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States
attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys . . . in the discharge of their respective
duties.” Id. § 519.
171. See United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 368 (8th Cir. 1975).
172. The Act provided that “there shall be appointed in each district a meet person learned in the
law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the
faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for
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placed expressly under the Attorney General’s oversight in 1861.173 This
might have been read to mean simply that the Attorney General had
authority to hire and fire and to prescribe general policy, and the uncertainty was exacerbated by later legislation, including an act “requiring the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to establish regulations for the guidance
of United States attorneys.”174 In 1869, the Supreme Court simply assumed
that district attorneys were subject to the Attorney General’s “superintendence and direction,” whether as a matter of “the usage of the government,” federal legislation, or the Court’s own decisions.175 The 1870 legislation creating the DOJ, while making it clear that the Attorney General
headed the agency, was also not explicit that prosecutors were intended to
answer to the Attorney General,176 and the legislative history is ambiguous.177 Internal DOJ guidance takes the view that the Attorney General
possesses plenary authority over subordinates, which is “rooted historically
in our common law and tradition,” 178 though based in legislation since
1870.179 The legislation itself is less clear than the DOJ’s guidance suggests.
crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States,” and that “there shall also be
appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall
be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when
requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their
departments.” The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
173. Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285; see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868).
174. Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 180–81
(1938) (citing Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 3, 14 Stat. 471); accord Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney
General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978) (“Congress was exhibiting a curious ambivalence about the role
of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice . . . .”).
175. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 458–59.
176. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. The 1870 legislation creating the DOJ
authorized the Attorney General to appoint special assistants to conduct litigation that district attorneys
could not conduct, but the law did not specifically authorize the Attorney General to direct the district
attorneys’ work. Id.
177. Compare Key, supra note 174, at 182 & n.66 (citing legislative statements suggesting the
Attorney General was meant to control federal prosecutors), with Bell, supra note 174, at 1054 (citing
contemporaneous legislation showing that “Congress . . . had not been serious about centralizing all
legal activity under the Attorney General”). At least with respect to the federal government’s civil
litigation, United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888), has been taken to establish the
centralization of authority in the Attorney General. Key, supra note 174, at 186–87.
178. The Att’y Gen.’s Role as Chief Litigator for the U.S., 6 Op. O.L.C. 47, 48 (1982) (first
citing Confiscation Cases, 7 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 458–59; and then citing The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 370 (1866)).
179. Id. (“Such authority . . . , since 1870, has been given a statutory basis.”) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 3106 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2012)). For a discussion of how decision-making should be
allocated in the DOJ between the Attorney General, United States attorneys, and subordinate
prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008).
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If the division of authority between the Attorney General and
subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the satisfaction
of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President
and the Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not. The
law is silent. On one hand, legislation does not explicitly make the
Attorney General and the DOJ independent of the President, as it has done
with some other executive agencies and officials.180 As a cabinet officer
and presidential advisor, the Attorney General plainly answers to the
President as to certain matters, and one might assume that absent an
express limitation on presidential power, the President may control the
Attorney General as to all matters. On the other hand, federal legislation
has never explicitly authorized the President to make decisions in criminal
investigations and prosecutions or to direct the decisions of the Attorney
General, United States Attorneys, or other prosecutors. Statutes leave it
uncertain whether there is a particular aspect of the Attorney General’s
work—criminal investigation and prosecution—as to which the Attorney
General, and through him, subordinate government lawyers, have ultimate
decision-making authority and must answer to the law, not the President.
In situations such as this one, where legislation is silent, courts look to
Congress’s implicit intent. Implicit legislative intent regarding the division
or allocation of power may be reflected not only in the structure and
purpose of legislation but in conduct, and attendant understandings, over
time—in other words, historical practice. Just as historical practice plays a
role in constitutional interpretation,181 courses of conduct and understandings developed over time help answer statutory interpretation
questions about the scope of presidential power.182 Congressional silence in
response to sustained or repeated conduct may express congressional
acquiescence in the exercise of authority.183 In particular, implied under180. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (“There shall be a General Counsel of the [National Labor
Relations] Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel . . . shall have final authority, on behalf of the
Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints . . ., and in respect of the
prosecution of such complaints before the Board. . . .”).
181. See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (“[I]n interpreting the
[Recess Appointments] Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice.” (emphasis
omitted)); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions.”).
182. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”),
quoted in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989). While Youngstown addressed
presidential power vis-à-vis Congress, the principle of interpretation applies equally to presidential
power vis-à-vis executive agencies and officials.
183. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981) (perceiving “a history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President”); id. at 686; United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474–75 (1914) (inferring congressional intent from “long-
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standings reflected in a course of conduct may inform questions about the
allocation of authority within the Executive Branch itself. As noted, the
Supreme Court’s earliest understanding regarding the allocation of power
between the Attorney General and district attorneys was not derived from
statutory language but from the course of dealings within the Executive
Branch.184
The next part of this Article shows that prosecutorial independence is
so clearly a part of our democratic system that Congress’s failure to
authorize presidential control shows acquiescence or implicit endorsement.
While the concept of congressional acquiescence has been challenged when
it comes to questions about the allocation of power between Congress and
the President,185 the concept should be far less controversial with regard to
the division of authority within the Executive Branch. Congress meant for
someone within the Executive Branch to have the last word on the conduct
of criminal cases—either the President or the Attorney General. If the law
is uncertain, there is no reason to presume which should possess this
authority. Congressional intent must be sought wherever it can be found.
Whether or not historic practice is dispositive, it can surely weigh heavily
in the balance. Because the Constitution, while providing pardon power,
does not otherwise authorize the President to act in criminal cases, the
President’s authority would be “at its lowest ebb” in the criminal context
unless, in a particular case, one could argue that an enumerated presidential
power was implicated.186
II. HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE
A. Overview
We turn to history at the invitation of Supreme Court cases as a means
to assess congressional intent.187 Even absent such an invitation, history is
critical in understanding the meaning of contemporary law and the
structure of democratic institutions. History is often contradictory. If done
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress”). See generally Shalev Roisman,
Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016).
184. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Matthew Baker, The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial Distortion of the
Legislative-Executive Balance of Power, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (2009) (citing skeptical
scholarship and Justices); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV.
67 (1988); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984).
186. Cf. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers . . . .”).
187. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
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well, it can confuse rather than simplify.188 While even originalists
acknowledge the shortcomings of historical analysis, they argue that the
intent of the Founders ought to govern our interpretation of the Constitution. Judges ought to be constrained in how they read the law, and
originalism, albeit imperfect, prevents them from drawing on their own
ideological or idiosyncratic views.189
This Part turns to history for a different, competing reason. The law
changes as society evolves, and if we don’t understand how and why, we
will be at a distinct disadvantage in untangling its present meaning. This
Part is designed to track the development of a concept, how it changed in
both meaning and purpose. Given the importance of balance of power in
our democracy, it is critical that we recognize how the system and structure
of government have changed to adapt to new circumstances while keeping
those core values intact. Once these subtle changes in government structure
become clearer, we can recognize and preserve this balance.
The relationship between the President and the DOJ, the Attorney
General, and the United States Attorneys is not static. As the federal
criminal justice system expanded, the pieces of that system evolved and
shifted in relation to each other. Punctuated by scandals and moments of
rapid growth, federal law enforcement changed from the job of a single
part-time employee to a massive organization with multiple departments,
over 10,000 lawyers, and myriad responsibilities.
This Part does not describe linear progress or consensus, but rather
points to one theme that has developed consistently as the organ of law
enforcement expanded and consolidated under the Executive Department.
Just as expertise formed the cornerstone of the administrative state, so too
professional independence became the defining characteristic of the DOJ.
Professional independence does not have a fixed meaning. It grew to
denote a distance from both the changing tide of popular opinion and the
ambitions of partisan politics. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the
debate over how to foster and ensure independence culminated in the
explicit articulation of the separation of the DOJ from presidential control.190
Throughout the twentieth century, the professional identity of the
lawyers in the DOJ grew increasingly important in defining the mission of
188. The postmodern critique of history undermined the integrity of the discipline by arguing
that the past is in the eye of the beholder. The inquiry is necessarily determined by the biases and
beliefs of each historian. See generally JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY
(1994) (summarizing this literature). In the wake of this critique, others have acknowledged the
impossibility of objectivity, but have argued that history is critical nonetheless. PETER NOVICK, THAT
NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
189. For a critique of originalism and textualism, see Nourse, supra note 30, at 101–07.
190. For a different interpretation of the evolving definition of prosecutorial independence, see
Spaulding, supra note 168.
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the office and its relationship to the Executive Branch. Legislators, courts,
and DOJ lawyers pointed to professional norms as the key to determining
the role of the Attorney General and federal prosecutors, and their
interactions with the President. The balance of powers in the Constitution
was designed to protect individual liberty and the rule of law. As the nature
of government changed, the meaning and importance of prosecutorial
independence evolved to preserve these central values.
As prosecutorial independence grew more central to the structure of
American criminal justice, its meaning shifted. Prosecutorial independence
in its older iteration rested on the distinction between law and politics. In
earlier understanding, the meaning was relatively unproblematic. The
Attorney General was independent from the President because of his
allegiance to the law, a clearly discernible body of edicts separate from
political inclination. In other words, critics assumed that the Attorney
General applied the law in a disinterested way. His discretion was limited,
not by political accountability, but by the determinate meaning of the law
he enforced. Independence, in this context, came with the job. By reading
the law accurately, the Attorney General was doing something different
from politicians, and as long as he did it well, he would necessarily be
independent from them.
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, the
distinction between law and politics began to collapse. Legal realists
argued that law was not a clearly discernible set of rules that yielded a
discrete answer when applied to different sets of facts. Instead, they
reduced law to the choices those in power make, choices that are clearly
formed by moral and ideological beliefs. As jurists and critics began to
accept this critique of the distinction between law and politics, prosecutorial independence grew more precarious. It had to rest on either a distinct
legal approach to solving problems or the personal integrity of the lawyer.
As the latter two definitions prevailed, the isolation of DOJ lawyers grew
increasingly important both to preserve their personal character from
corruption and to hone their distinct skills and craft.
B. The Attorney General in the Beginning
As discussed above, the significance of early federal criminal practice
is mixed.191 To frame the history of prosecutorial independence, it is
191. See supra Subpart I.B. These scholars use originalism as an approach to statutory or
constitutional interpretation. In other words, they purport to use history to ascertain the meaning of law
at a particular time, assuming that the contemporary understanding ought to reflect that original public
meaning. For a critique of the way many academics have used history to support their ideological
commitments in legal scholarship, see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523–29 (1995).
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important to understand that the notion of prosecutorial independence
animated early criminal practice as it does today. Federal criminal prosecutions were rare, and responsibility for enforcing laws was dispersed largely
among local actors. Prosecutorial independence was a function of this
reality as much as it was a product of theoretical commitment.
When Congress created the office of the Attorney General in 1789,192
the office was weak, perhaps intentionally so.193 Underfunded and poorly
staffed, the Attorney General lacked office space and supplies. The salary
was low relative to other offices created by the First Congress, and it soon
became clear that it was only a part-time job.194 Lawyers were expected to
continue in private practice, and the remuneration was, in part, the prestige
that would come from the post.195 Other than representing the government
in the Supreme Court and giving opinions on the law, the duties were
vague. The Judiciary Act perpetuated a system of district attorneys,
“learned in the law,” who would prosecute “all delinquents for crimes and
offenses, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil
actions in which the United States shall be concerned” but gave the
Attorney General no supervisory power over these prosecutors, who
worked in the lower courts throughout the country.196
Original drafts of the Judiciary Act, which empowered district courts to
appoint local prosecutors and the Supreme Court to select the Attorney
General, suggest that prosecutors were viewed, at least by some, as judicial
officers, clearly immune from presidential control.197 Sensitive to the
debate over the power of the federal government, the final draft of the
192. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. The office of the Attorney
General was modeled in part on the English predecessor but the colonies had created attorneys general
as well. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6 (Ernest S. Griffith & Hugh Langdon
Elsbree eds., 1967).
193. Legislators in the First Congress were reluctant to create a strong wing of federal law
enforcement, fearful of the cost of centralization to liberty. HUSTON, supra note 192, at 4–5. The Act
itself was a compromise, designed to unite those in favor of strong federal government and those fearful
of its potential dangers. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 458 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 109 (1923).
194. CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 16–17 (Routledge 2015) (1992); The position did not become full-time until
1853 when Caleb Cushing assumed the post and pushed for greater support. HUSTON, supra note 192,
at 9–11.
195. President Washington informed his Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, that the position
would “confer pre-eminence” which would serve as an advantage in his private practice. Luther A.
Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 6 (1968).
196. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. The district attorneys did not answer
directly to anyone until 1830, at which point Congress put the Secretary of Treasury in charge of their
operations. It wasn’t until 1861 that district attorneys officially reported to the Attorney General.
197. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 46–47 (1992); Warren, supra note 193, at 109.
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statute was silent on the matter.198 Despite the fear of a strong federal
government, the President quickly assumed the task of appointing the
Attorney General, asking the Senate for advice and consent, which soon
became the norm.199 The President’s ability to appoint the Attorney General
was not mandated by the law or Constitution but rather a matter of practice.
The trappings of the Attorney General’s post were slim and the tasks
poorly defined. The first attorneys general occupied themselves mostly by
giving opinions on the law, because federal criminal law was sparse and
there were few cases in the Supreme Court in the early years. The statute
was silent about the relationship between the Attorney General and the
Legislature, but attorneys general regularly responded to Congress’s
request for opinions on the legality of proposed legislation. In practice, in
the early years, the Attorney General occupied a position in between all
three branches of government.
The legislative history of the Judiciary Act and early practice can
support either strong presidential control or a more diffuse notion of prosecution.200 This ambiguity is unsurprising given the fact that the Judiciary
Act itself was a compromise, designed to unite those in favor of strong
federal government and those fearful of its potential dangers.201
The nature of criminal law enforcement in the new republic, which
mostly occurred at the local level, made it difficult, if not impossible, for
the President to exert power even if he were so inclined. Oddly, states and
private citizens were just as likely to institute proceedings against an
individual for federal criminal offenses as federal prosecutors, which made
it even harder for the President to exert his influence.202 The law and reality
of federal prosecution meant that district attorneys were largely autonomous.203
Federal criminal law at the time was far less expansive than it is now.
Many doubted and resisted the federal government’s power to prosecute
crimes at all.204 The isolated acts of early presidents notwithstanding, the
Executive did not exercise centralized control over criminal justice.205
Federal prosecutions tended to implicate other core executive functions
because the federal criminal law itself was confined to only a few offenses
198. Warren, supra note 193, at 107–09. For a discussion of how problematic originalism is, in
part due to the contradictory impulses and complex compromises that led to the provisions of the
Constitution, see PURCELL, JR., supra note 123, at 3–17.
199. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 17–18 (1937); Bloch, supra
note 44, at 568.
200. See supra Subpart I.B.
201. GOEBEL, supra note 193, at 458 (1971); Warren, supra note 193, at 107–09.
202. Krent, supra note 136, at 304–07; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 19–20.
203. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 16.
204. ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1938, at 17 (2011).
205. Id. at 20.
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with strong implications for national interests. Most of the prosecutions in
which presidents chose to interfere involved interests that were even more
fundamental to the new nation than most federal criminal proceedings.206
This is not to say that there is no evidence of the early concept of executive
control over prosecutorial decisions but rather that such control is far less
remarkable than it would be today. Interfering in these particular cases was
a way of ensuring policy objectives in areas of central national concern.
The ambiguity in the Judiciary Act may have appeased concerns about
a strong federal Judiciary and law enforcement power. The narrow scope
and infrequent application of federal criminal law most likely made
presidents’ interference seem less of a threat to the principles of AntiFederalists.
In the first decades of the new republic, individuals could be prosecuted under federal common law as well as statutory edicts. It was not until
1812 that the Court put an end to this practice, holding that individuals
could not be federally prosecuted unless Congress had declared their
conduct criminal.207 The controversy over the federal common law of
crimes shows how contested federal criminal prosecutions were. The
Court’s decision in 1812 demonstrated a growing willingness and desire to
limit the executive power over criminal law enforcement by eliminating
this entire set of unwritten criminal offenses.208 Unlike in England, written
law rather than traditions would define the scope of government power. In
this context, the idea that federal executive control over prosecution was
settled is a bit nonsensical. The nature of prosecution, along with the power
of the federal government to convict individuals of crimes against the
sovereignty, was itself in dispute. If anything, in 1812, the vision of limited
federal control over prosecution prevailed.
The failure of the Treasury in collecting debts after the War of 1812 led
President Jackson to propose greater central control over federal criminal
law enforcement.209 Daniel Webster led the charge against the bill, arguing
that it would create a monster: “A half accountant, a half lawyer, a half
clerk—in fine, a half of every thing, and not much of any thing.”210 In
essence, Webster worried that the Attorney General’s professional status
206. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 143.
207. Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Godwin, The Jeffersonian
Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 919–21 (1992).
For a general discussion of the debate over federal common law of crimes, see G. EDWARD WHITE, 1
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 230–32 (2012).
208. Rowe, supra note 207, at 922. In 1837, the Supreme Court again expressed concern about
federal criminal law enforcement power, suggesting that general police powers belonged to the states.
See City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 133 (1837).
209. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 144–45. A resolution proposing similar
control over federal law enforcement had been introduced in 1819 but did not pass. Id.
210. Twenty-First Congress – 1st Session, 38 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 115, 115 (1830).
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would grow meaningless if such an array of obligations were assigned to
him. It would distract him from “studying his books of law.”211 Ultimately,
Webster proposed a new position, Solicitor of the Treasury: a lawyer to
supervise the district attorneys.212
The early attorneys general had different views on the nature of their
job and the power of the President to direct law enforcement decisions.
William Wirt, Attorney General to James Monroe and John Quincy Adams,
insisted that the President had no power to second-guess the decisions of
executive officials. The President’s job was to see to it that they faithfully
executed the laws but not to manage particular decisions.213 The distinction
between the two seemed fairly unproblematic to Wirt. Taking care that the
law was faithfully executed did not imply the ability to direct or control
particular decisions. To the contrary, to fulfill his job under the “Take
Care” clause, the President had to defer to prosecutors’ knowledge and
expertise.
Expressing faith in professional expertise, Wirt explained that it was
not the responsibility of the Attorney General, or the Secretary or
Comptroller of the Treasury, to instruct the district attorneys in the
discharge of their duties. The Judiciary Act, according to Wirt, required
that district attorneys be persons “learned in the law” so that they can
interpret and apply the law wisely: “It could never have been considered,
therefore, as among the duties of [the President], that he should instruct and
direct the district attorneys as to the mere technicalities of their
profession.”214 Respecting spheres of knowledge and expertise, Wirt
understood that the President would not necessarily be so “learned.” In
order to fulfill his obligations, the President had to rely on the legal
expertise of those around him. In other words, Wirt respected the professional status of prosecutors at all levels and required government officials
to defer to their expertise and professional judgment. He read the ambiguity
of the Judiciary Act with professional norms in mind, concluding that the
drafters must have intended to leave “technical and professional” details to
the discretion of lawyers.215 Writing about presidential control over
accounting officers, Wirt similarly concluded that the duty of the President
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed does not mean that he is

211. Id.
212. Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, 4 Stat. 414, 414–16.
213. The President & Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 624 (1823).
214. Att’y Gen. & Dist. Atty’s, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 608, 611 (1823). Wirt explained that the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller can similarly do their jobs, but they cannot interfere with
the pleadings, which ought to be left to the “law-officer intrusted [sic] with that peculiar duty.” Id. Wirt
viewed the obligation to supervise as the duty to ensure that the official was doing his job with
“vigilance, industry, and integrity” but not to manage particular decisions. Id. at 612.
215. Id. at 613.
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“required to execute them himself.”216 As long as the officers “discharge
their duties faithfully, the President has no authority to interfere.”217
But Wirt’s view was not universal. Roger Taney, Attorney General
from 1831 to 1833, concluded that the President could order a district
attorney to discontinue a suit to forfeit stolen jewels belonging to the King
of the Netherlands. The jewels had been stolen from the royal family and
smuggled illegally into the United States. The President wanted to return
the jewels to their owner who had not violated the law. Deriving the
authority from the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed, Taney wrote, “I think the President does possess the power. The
interest of the country and the purposes of justice manifestly require that he
should possess it.”218 Taney’s view clearly diverged from Wirt’s, but he
was tentative in his conclusion and the case was one that directly
implicated foreign relations, another core executive interest. He qualified
his conclusion by insisting that in this instance justice required the
President’s intervention. The President’s power was not absolute or
limitless but rather used sparingly for the sake of justice. Even Taney, who,
at the time, defended the Jacksonian view of strong executive power,
agreed with Wirt that the exercise of that power had to further communal
goals.219
Scholars who trace the unitary Executive to the early republic recount
an incident during President Jackson’s administration. During the
controversy over the United States Bank, Attorney General Taney
expressed some reservations about the legality of depositing United States
funds in state banks, at which point President Jackson reportedly replied:
“Sir, you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney
General who will.”220 To proponents of a strong executive, this episode
shows that the Attorney General was never truly a check on presidential
power. But it also illustrates that attorneys general, even those who, like
Taney, were committed to a strong executive, viewed their job as
216. Id.
217. The President & Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. at 624.
218. The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 482, 487 (1831). Wirt did not
consider representing the government in lower courts as part of his job: “I do not consider myself as the
advocate of the government . . . but as a judge, called to decide a question of law with the impartiality
and integrity which characterizes the judician.” CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 90.
219. As Attorney General, Roger Taney had helped President Jackson close the Second Bank of
the United States over the strong objection of members of Senate and Congress. ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 88–102 (1945). During his tenure as Chief Justice, when
Lincoln was President, Taney’s position on the power of the Executive shifted dramatically. JAMES F.
SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR 193
(2006). This biographical fact illustrates that attitudes toward presidential power are, at least to a certain
extent, motivated by politics.
220. Senator George H. Williams recounted this exchange, but most consider it apocryphal.
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 109.
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significant. Interpreting the law for the President was not merely an act of
advocacy but rather a professional exercise distinct from politics. Either
way, the fate of the bank, like the crown jewels prosecution, was central to
national economic policy, and the story, while dramatic, is considered by
most apocryphal.
The position of attorneys general shifted depending on the issues at
hand. There was no consensus about the power of the President and
attitudes changed with practical and political tides. John Crittenden,
Attorney General during Millard Fillmore’s Presidency, reaffirmed Wirt’s
modest understanding of presidential power, arguing that the President has
no power to direct district marshals. He wrote that while it is the duty of the
President to take care that the federal law is faithfully executed, “it is not,
in general, judicious for him to interfere with the functions of subordinate
officers further than to remove them for any neglect or abuse of their
official trust.”221 The opinion, responding to a New York marshal’s request
to hire counsel at public expense to defend him in fugitive slave law cases,
may well have reflected a desire to avoid direct intervention in such a
contentious issue, but it nonetheless affirmed the independence of subordinate federal officials.222
As the duties of federal prosecutors expanded along with the scope and
reach of federal criminal law, the attorneys general were at least sensitive
to the practical necessity of official discretion. In 1855, Caleb Cushing
explained that the Executive is vested in one man with the understanding
that he cannot perform all the tasks on his own but concluded that no head
of department could directly defy the President because otherwise Congress
could subvert executive power by dividing it into independent pieces.223
Unsurprisingly, opinions of the early attorneys general do not reflect a
consensus on the relationship between the President and federal prosecutors. Political exigencies tend to affect views on the power of the
Executive in general and the President in particular. To the extent that there
is a uniting thread, it is that where the prosecution concerns an issue that
otherwise affects the President’s core functions; his ability to interfere is at
its highest. A president who directs his attorney general ought to do so only
when it is necessary to promote justice. But there ought to be a respect and
deference, at the least, to professional prosecutors and other officials, who
221. Duty of the President Respecting Dist. Marshals, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 287, 287 (1851).
222. Id. Crittenden wrote, “[I]t appears to me most judicious for the President, as well as more
consistent with the form and spirit of our institutions, to forbear from interference with the functions of
subordinate public officers, and to leave them to discharge of their proper duties under all their legal
responsibilities, and subject, also, to removal from office for every neglect or abuse of their official
trust.” Id. at 288.
223. Relation of the President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–70 (1855). Edward
Bates expressed a similar opinion about the practical impossibility of actual supervision. Relation of the
President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 527, 528 (1868).
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have developed expertise in applying the law, and professional norms
regarding what sort of motivations are appropriate.
C. The Civil War and Changing Understandings
of Federal Law Enforcement
As the country moved toward the Civil War, the scope of federal criminal law expanded to accommodate the increasingly complex nature of the
country’s problems. The Attorney General spent a greater portion of his
time on criminal law enforcement, and the nature of the problems proved
not only complex but also divisive. To cope with the political and legal
questions of the day, Attorney General had become a full-time cabinet
position.224
Up until this point, the Attorney General exerted minimal control over
district attorneys in individual criminal cases.225 Recognizing that he
needed a greater degree of power as the nation moved toward war,
Attorney General Bates urged the Legislature to consider putting the
district attorneys under his supervision. Congress ultimately enacted a
statute granting the Attorney General authority over district attorneys226 and
enabling him to employ special assistants to help in individual prosecutions.227 The Supreme Court held nonetheless that, while the Attorney
General had general supervisory authority, it was the sole duty of local
district attorneys to represent the United States in civil and criminal
cases.228
Edward Bates, Attorney General for President Lincoln, was controversial, and history has not been entirely kind to him. Among other things,
he issued an opinion supporting Lincoln’s decision to suspend habeas
rights, which most legal scholars have considered illegal.229 Given this
criticism, his professed view of the office as independent from the President might seem ironic. He wrote, “The office I hold is not properly
political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty above all other ministers of
224. Baker, supra note 185, at 59.
225. See Att’y General & Dist. Attorneys, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 608, 611 (1823); The Jewels of the
Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 491–92 (1831); Office & Duties of the Att’y Gen., 6 Op.
Att’y Gen. 326, 338 (1854). Cushing insisted that it was wrong to interfere in individual cases. Gov’t
Suits, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 465 (1855).
226. Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. Congress quickly passed an explanatory
act, noting that the Solicitor of the Treasury still retained control over the district attorneys. Act of Aug.
6, 1861, ch. 65, 12 Stat. 327, 327.
227. Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 285.
228. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868).
229. See AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO
GUANTANAMO BAY 185–199 (2017) (criticizing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas during the Civil War);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2007) (extending habeas protection to enemy combatants
detained in Guantanamo Bay).
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State to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever
quarter, of mere will and power.”230 The irony, however, reflects the reality
that political and practical pressures tend to motivate presidents and their
attorneys general. Despite these exigencies, actors for the most part have
not lost sight of the ideal of independence that ran from Wirt’s tenure
through the mid-nineteenth century, despite the changes in the nature of the
job.
Even by mid-century, it was unclear who, if anyone, controlled district
attorneys’ decision-making. The early controversies over the Whiskey
Rebellion and similar prosecutions with national implications were no
longer the norm. The President was otherwise occupied. The tradition of
prosecutorial independence, in part, grew out of this practical reality. But
as the economic and social life of the nation grew more complex, the
system of independent local federal law officers proved chaotic, leaving the
application of federal law inconsistent and unpredictable.231 Attorney
General Randolph sought control over local law enforcement officers in
1791, but it was not until 1850 that his demands seemed pressing.232 The
move toward centralization thus had little to do with presidential power and
more to do with coordination and even-handed justice. One could have
tried to ensure consistency by centralizing control, but instead, Congress
sought to minimize vagaries and injustice by professionalizing the job.
While bills were being introduced to formalize the law department, the
Attorney General was gradually taking responsibility for more tasks, as the
scope and complexity of criminal law continued to grow. Attorney General
Caleb Cushing pushed for greater official control over the law business of
the country, explaining that, while the executive power is vested in the
President, he could not perform all executive duties by himself, and many
responsibilities had to be delegated.233 Cushing further explained that when
the President delegates duties to officials, their work must be their own
rather than the President’s.234 Despite his understanding of official
discretion, Cushing concluded that the department heads could not
“lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President.”235
As the nation neared the Civil War, the stakes of the legal questions
were higher. District attorneys reached out to Attorney General Bates for

230. Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General as the President’s Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 51 (1968).
231. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 81 (1985).
232. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 142; see supra notes 210–12 (discussing
earlier attempts by Webster to centralize the law department).
233. Relationship of the President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 460 (1855).
234. Id. at 463.
235. Id. at 469–70.
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direction in how to apply federal criminal law during the mounting
insurrection. Controlled chaos reigned as members of the military sometimes took matters into their own hands. The necessity for centralized
control grew increasingly obvious and elusive at the same time.236 After
Lincoln was assassinated, Bates criticized his successor, Attorney General
James Speed, insisting that he was a political hack, not a real professional,
“with not much reputation as a lawyer, and perhaps, no strong confidence
in his own opinions, he was caressed and courted . . . and sank . . . into a
mere tool—to give such opinions as were wanted.”237 The President was
involved in decisions about whether to try leaders of the Confederacy, and
district attorneys deferred despite pressure from Congress.238 Bates
expressed concern that a weak and unprincipled attorney general would not
stand up to a president. The rule of law would cave if he did not insist on
the legality of the President’s actions. Bates was sure that, to resist
improper pressure, a lawyer needed professional knowledge and confidence, qualities lacking in his successor.
D. The Creation of the Department of Justice in 1870
The Civil War left numerous legal problems in its wake. The most
obvious—the civil rights of the newly emancipated slaves—were not
necessarily considered the most pressing. There were issues of land
ownership, debt, and taxes. The DOJ was finally created amidst this chaos,
if not entirely because of it.239 Jed Shugarman has argued that the statute
creating the DOJ and consolidating its power under the Executive was not
established to increase the power of the federal government or to protect
the civil rights of newly emancipated black citizens, but rather as an effort
to cut budgets and trim excessive spending.240 The DOJ did not grow out of
a concerted campaign to build the federal government in the wake of the
Civil War, but it did reflect a trend toward professionalization.241 This
Subpart argues that the two are not inconsistent. The effort to install
professional lawyers and rationalize an increasingly splintered system
provided a way to justify, or at least address, concerns about the increase in
power at the executive level.242

236. See generally CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 188–217.
237. Id. at 204.
238. Id. at 207–08.
239. Jed Handelsman Shugarman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2014).
240. Id. at 123.
241. Id.
242. The Civil War and Reconstruction gave birth to the modern American state. Regulatory
agencies and civil service reform were central to the consolidation of federal power. RICHARD
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As Stephen Skowronek and other historians have argued, the birth of
the administrative state during the last decades of the nineteenth century
coincided with a new faith in professionalism and expertise to combat the
degenerative nature of party politics and the corrosive effects of capitalism.
Professional associations emerged, along with the research university, at
the end of the century with a mission, not only to bring rationalization and
order to the federal government, but also to promote expertise, study, and
professionalism as mechanisms to combat corruption, waste, and the
excesses of a capitalist economy.243 Historians have traced this civil service
reform impulse to post-war movements, which were eventually led by the
Mugwumps and, later, Progressive-era reformers.244 Prior to the Pendleton
Act of 1883, which reformed the bureaucracy and created the Civil Service
Commission, civil service members largely were aspiring politicians who
owed allegiance only to the party members who appointed them. Reform
changed both the nature of the job and the social class of those who filled
it.
Civil service reform itself was part of an effort to check the corrupt
accumulation of power with a body of experts, who were career employees
with particular expertise and no direct ties to the party in power. Some
scholars argue that when the Tenure in Office Act,245 which allowed the
Senate to reject the President’s choice to remove a department head, was
repealed in 1869, the notion of a unitary Executive was affirmed.246 This
argument overlooks the fact that professional norms of government lawyers
were seen as an important check on presidential power even if the chief
executive retained the sole authority to remove officers. While the Revised
Tenure in Office Act did consolidate most removal power in the White
House, it “block[ed] [the President’s] power to fire U.S. Attorneys and
FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA,
1859–1877, at 341–42, 421–24 (1990).
243. SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 1890–1920, at 105 (1964); THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY (1977); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 138–47 (1977); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991);
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982). It was during this period that Charles Francis Adams
conceived of an independent commission staffed by experts to govern railroads. Charles F. Adams, The
Railroad System, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 333, 426–29 (N.Y.C., HENRY HOLT & CO.
1886) (1871).
244. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 164–68 (1955); Lee J. Alston et al., Who
Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873, 66 J. ECON. HIST. 674, 676
(2006) (pointing to 1873 legislation to increase congressional salaries as part of a sustained
anticorruption reform movement).
245. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During
the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18–50 (2004).
246. Id.
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other principal officers,” limiting his control over federal prosecution.247 It
created a permanent corps of civil servants whose positions rested on merit
rather than spoils. This contributed to a shift from parochial politics to
nationalism, but it did so not simply by expanding executive power, but by
altering and in some ways limiting the political power of the President and
appointed department heads within the Executive.248 In other words, the
diffuse nature of governance was not eliminated but rather imported into
the structure of the administrative state.
Like the growth of the administrative state, the consolidation of the
government’s legal work within the DOJ was designed to preserve
professional norms as both a check on executive power and an antidote to
local corruption.249 While attorneys general over the past century had
disagreed over the relationship between the President and his law enforcement officers and often acted to increase the power of the incumbent
President, they all, to some degree or another, subscribed to Wirt’s
understanding of the profession and its role in government.
In discussing the proposed act to create a law department, legislators
expressed a desire to regulate the abuse of party patronage. As Senator
James A. Bayard explained, “[t]he object of the bill is the prevention of
what I may call the sporadic system of paying fees to persons, not to speak
disrespectfully of them, who may be called departmental favorites.”250 The
bill, as one legislator explained, “takes care, then, that these officers shall
be well informed on legal questions.”251 While some expressed concern that
the bill would increase the size and the expense of government, its
proponents assured them that it was designed to create efficiency. The
professional nature of a legal department would prevent both error and
waste.252 Skill, expertise, and knowledge would create efficiency, which in
turn would ensure fairness.253
A centralized law department would not only preserve quality and
efficiency, but also prevent cronyism and draw on professionalism to
prevent both political and personal incentives from perverting criminal

247. Shugarman, supra note 239, at 150.
248. See Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 301,
317–18 (1959).
249. A Department of Justice, 8 ALB. L.J. 274, 274 (1873) (arguing that the competence, skill,
and efficiency of a bureau staffed by professionals will combat waste and corruption).
250. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4490 (1870).
251. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3065 (1870).
252. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3034–35 (1870).
253. Its author explained that “[o]ne of the objects of this bill is to establish a staff of law officers
sufficiently numerous and of sufficient ability to transact this law business of the Government in all
parts of the United States.” CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3035 (1870).
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justice.254 Representative Thomas Jenckes, who introduced the bill and
ushered it through Congress, explained:
We have found, too, that these law officers, being subject to the control of
the heads of the Departments, in some instances give advice which seems
to have been instigated by the heads of the Department, or at least advice
which seems designed to strengthen the resolution to which the head of
the Department may have come in a particular instance.255

District attorneys and their paid assistants in the West often acted in their
own interest or corruptly helped themselves and their allies. Paid by the
case or fine, they pursued cases that had little merit.256 By consolidating all
legal personnel under the Attorney General, the authors of the bill hoped to
remove the taint of this sort of cronyism and promote independence by
creating a purely professional branch of government. Prosecutors would
serve the law rather than the highest bidder or a partisan political master.
Jenckes was concerned not only with legislative overreach, but also
with the ability of the Executive to use patronage as a way of
circumventing political checks.257 President Johnson had appointed friends
and allies to halt the progress of Radical Republicans in Congress.258 Civil
service reform, in general, and the DOJ in particular, would curb executive
and congressional abuses by ensuring an “independent administration of
affairs.”259 Jenckes explained: “The humblest servant of the Government
should not be at the mercy or the caprice of the most distinguished
politician. Let every man who may receive a commission from the United
States know that he holds it from the people, in service of the people.”260
Jenckes held up the military as an example of independent professional
pride in service, which acts as a break on partisan politics.
While Jenckes acknowledged that attorneys general had in the past
issued opinions just to suit the political view of the Administration, he
labeled it “a misfortune” and insisted that the consolidation of all legal
work in one department would reduce such deviations from the pure
practice of law.261 Like his predecessors, he expressed faith in the clearly
254. The expulsion of many Democratic politicians after the Civil War led to an increase in
corruption and cronyism in politics, which fueled the Mugwumps’ reform movement. In addition,
weaknesses in American bureaucracy grew more apparent as wartime demands increased.
255. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
256. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 250–71.
257. Ari Hoogenboom, Thomas A. Jenckes and Civil Service Reform, 47 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 636, 637 (1961).
258. Id. at 640.
259. Address of Hon. Thos. A. Jenckes, of Rhode Island, Before the American Social Science
Association in Boston, BOS. POST, Dec. 31, 1868, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1869. In this speech,
Jenckes discussed the value of his proposal for civil service reform, which had similar animating
principles as his bill to create a law department. Id.
260. Id.
261. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
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distinguishable realms of law and politics. When confronted with the
anecdote about President Jackson ordering his Attorney General to write an
opinion justifying the deposit of federal funds, Jenckes replied: “I have
heard such anecdotes. It is true that the head of a Department or the
President may act on his own responsibility, but he cannot in such a case
shelter himself behind the opinion of a solicitor.”262 In other words, the
consolidation of federal legal work in the DOJ would render purely
political decisions transparent because the legal advice would inevitably be
professional and shielded from the taint of political expediency.
The new statutes enacted to preserve civil rights in the South tested the
new department, thrusting it into the business of criminal law enforcement
on an unprecedented scale.263 Federal prosecutors called for assistance in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and the criminal provisions in the
statutes known as the Enforcement and Ku Klux Klan Acts amidst strong
resistance in the South. Witnesses who feared for their lives appealed
directly to the President for assistance.264 Up until the Civil War, state
prosecutors were responsible for most criminal prosecutions. The structure
of the federal criminal justice system was still so diffuse that it was difficult
for the Attorney General to exert control over federal prosecution.265
During early Reconstruction, the Attorney General struggled to control
local federal prosecutors. Local law enforcement was either too weak or
disinclined to prosecute the Ku Klux Klan, and Attorney General
Ackerman “issued a circular to all United States Attorneys” and Marshals
to enforce the new laws.266 For several years, the Administration and
Attorney General tried to use the central structure of the DOJ to ensure that
federal policy priorities were honored. Despite the effort, there were few
enforcement actions, proving how stubborn and persistent the local, diffuse
nature of criminal law enforcement was.267 In 1871, Ackerman suddenly
resigned.268 Despite his resignation, the DOJ continued its vigorous
enforcement through 1873. The DOJ grew in both size and power to meet
these demands. As political parties warred over the nature of civil rights,
the future of the DOJ lay in large part in criminal law enforcement, and the
DOJ lawyers were more overt about their political commitments and party
loyalty.269
262. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
263. The end of the Civil War marked a radical shift in American politics where even moderate
Republicans grew to expect that Congress would help secure civil rights. See generally KACZOROWSKI,
supra note 231, at 56–57.
264. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 238.
265. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 231, at 81.
266. Id. at 81.
267. Id. at 81–83.
268. Id. at 92.
269. Id. at 65.
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Increasingly, disagreement over Reconstruction policies in the DOJ
focused on the independence of the agency. As in the early cases, in which
presidents felt the need to intervene, the national interests were high.
Criminal cases coincided with national policy. By 1873, the political inclination to enforce the civil rights laws had ebbed. One journalist complained
in The Nation of the “inflation” of federal law enforcement power: “[T]he
Attorney-General’s office has become a kind of political bureau.”270 The
article noted that the Attorney General was not directly politically accountable. This might be tolerable, but he had “not displayed any talent either
legal or political . . . . He is, moreover, acting as the servant of a President
who treats his ministers as members of his staff.”271 The author took for
granted that prosecutors are not the same as staff members subject to any
direct order.
The progressive faith in expertise and training spurred civil service
reform in this period. The work of governing required merit, training, and
education. Far from serving these ends, short terms of service and elections
led to a corrupt system of patronage. Woodrow Wilson published a book in
1885 arguing for a merit system, which would leave much of the work of
government to experts.272 In making his argument, Wilson explained that
the Executive was divided between elected officials who make policy and
those who govern through learning and experience. “The President is not
all of the Executive. He cannot get along without the men whom he
appoints . . . and they are really integral parts of that branch of the
government which he titularly contains in his one single person.”273
Cabinet heads “were always recognized units in the system, never mere
ciphers to the Presidential figure which led them. Their wills counted as
independent wills.”274 Quoting MacMillan’s magazine, Wilson wrote that
“[e]ach cabinet officer . . . controls his own department pretty much as he
pleases,”275 and that the Executive itself is made up of a number of
different individuals who retain independence, power, and control.276
Critical of the inefficiency that came with the separation of powers, Wilson
posited a permanent and powerfully trained civil service, which would
retain a good deal of control over the business of governing.277
While the intention was clear, the statute did not rid the federal system
270. The Inflation of the Attorney-General, 19 THE NATION 214, 214 (Oct. 1, 1874), reprinted in
THE NATION (Jan. 12, 2005), https://www.thenation.com/article/inflation-attorney-general.
271. Id.
272. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 290 (1885).
273. Id. at 257.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 258 (quoting Joseph Lemuel Chester, The Washington Cabinet and the American
Secretaryship of State, 7 MACMILLAN’S 62, 67 (1862)).
276. Id. at 248–300.
277. Id.

1 GREEN-ROIPHE-1-76 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/17/2018 10:59 AM

Can the President Control the Department of Justice?

55

of its decentralized nature, and old reporting lines and allegiances
remained.278 The professionalization of the DOJ required isolation from the
business of administration. Theodore Roosevelt explained that politicians
also needed to respect attorneys’ obligations. He wrote to his Attorney
General:
Of all the officers of the Government, those of the Department of Justice
should be kept most free from any suspicion of improper action on
partisan or factional grounds . . . so that there shall be gradually a
growth . . . in the knowledge that the Federal courts and the representatives of the Federal Department of Justice insist on meting out evenhanded justice . . . .”279

Once again, even-handed justice seemed a relatively unproblematic term,
an accessible norm, as long as prosecutors and other government attorneys
were insulated from political control.
The DOJ was thus designed as an insular arena where lawyer
professionals could thrive. Merit, standards of practice, and a common
approach to legal problems would lend both quality and uniformity to
federal law enforcement. Professionalism was designed to combat political
pressure; therefore, presidential or other political control of prosecutors
was inconsistent with the vision behind the law department.
E. Early Twentieth Century
Despite the new law establishing the DOJ, the legal work of the
country remained decentralized. Lines of reporting were weak and department heads retained control of legal work.280 Early twentieth-century
treatises similarly embraced a presidency balanced and checked by administration, rather than a hierarchical bureaucracy controlled entirely by the
President.
In the United States it was undoubtedly intended that the President should
be little more than a political chief; that is to say, one whose functions
should, in the main, consist in the performance of those political duties
which are not subject to judicial control. It is quite clear that it was
intended that he should not, except as to these political matters, be the
administrative head of the government, with general power of directing
and controlling the acts of subordinate federal administrative agents.281

278. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 488.
279. Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Att’y Gen. Moody (Aug. 9, 1904) (quoted in
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 500).
280. Key, supra note 174, at 190–91.
281. 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, 2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1156 (1910).
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The treatise continued, however, that the need for efficiency in an increasingly complex world had led to a growingly centralized power. The author
insisted that while a president could not directly control the decisions of a
district attorney, the power of removal leant him that indirect authority.282
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the federal regulatory state
was transforming. There was less antipathy to large government as
reformers increasingly turned to legislatures and administrative bodies to
temper the effects of the modern industrial economy.283 The fight against
corruption joined forces with the Progressive search for efficiency and
economy. Expert centralized control was seen as the antidote to local,
disorganized, corrupt party politics. By 1920, Congress had successfully
resisted the executive effort to consolidate control over the federal
bureaucracy.284 Congress established connection with administrative agencies and career civil servants.
By 1908, Wilson, who had initially suggested that the Legislature
retain the greatest amount of power, had recognized the value of a strong
Executive, but he still noted the importance of a permanent, trained, expert
civil service as a check on partisan excess.285 The desire for coordination,
efficiency, and organic energy led him to favor consolidation of power, but
it also fed his faith in expertise and experience in the bureaucratic management as a way to prevent the abuse of that power.
As the administrative state expanded and consolidated, the President
was not the clear winner. When the army and bureaucracy grew out of
necessity to meet the demands of World War I, agencies maintained significant independence. In 1918, now-President Wilson issued an executive
order calling for the consolidation of all legal work under the DOJ.286
Despite President Wilson’s edict, Congress continued to disperse control of
the legal work of the government.287 The Attorney General complained as
late as 1928 about the DOJ’s lack of centralized control.288
The American state itself was born and grew to maturity as a bulwark
against despotism.289 Thus, as the demands of the modern world grew more
complex, the checks and balances within government grew more numer-

282. Id. at 1166.
283. SKOWRONEK, supra note 243, at 4.
284. Id.
285. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 215 (Colum.
Paperback ed. 1961) (1908).
286. W.P.A. HISTORICAL RECORDS SURVEY, NEW YORK CITY, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE
ORDERS 242 (Clifford L. Lord ed., 1944) (citing Exec. Order No. 2877 (1918)).
287. Key, supra note 174, at 190–91.
288. 1928 ATT’Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 1, at 1–2, 343–50.
289. William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 763
(2008).
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ous.290 Organized governance and power dispersed. Civil service reform
and the DOJ were part of this process. The larger and more powerful the
state became, the more it developed multiple creative checks on its power.
This centrifugal force continued to disperse power among local district
attorneys and other government lawyers.291 Even though the DOJ was more
centralized than its precursor, it was still vast, and power still resided in
relatively autonomous local units.292 Far from a clear consolidation of
executive power under the President, the professionalization of prosecution
maintained the diffuse authority that characterized the origins of American
criminal justice. As a result, the expansion of national power did not
necessarily risk the consolidation of power.
Justice Southerland explained how professionalism worked to retain
the diffuse nature of power in the context of independent commissions:
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of
its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement
of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political
nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. [I]ts
members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of
experts appointed by law and informed by experience.293

Respect for law and the traditions of the agency itself would govern the
commission. Independence was a product of isolation, expertise, and
historical respect for the nature of its work. The DOJ was created in this
model.
During the Progressive Era and the New Deal, most lawmakers and
policy experts grew more comfortable with the idea of an active state,
involved in solving both social and economic problems.294 Those disillusioned with party politics gravitated to expertise, organizational efficiency,
and professionalism. It is understandable in this context that the DOJ drew
fewer critics. A department filled with professionals would withstand the
inappropriate pressures of partisan and personal interest. Meanwhile,
federal criminal law expanded. Prohibition, labor unrest, and organized
crime led to a proliferation of federal criminal statutes and law enforcement
personnel.295
Some have argued that during this time the Attorney General took on a
290. Id.
291. CLAYTON, supra note 194, at 3.
292. Novak, supra note 289, at 765–66.
293. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
294. Proponents of a unitary Executive point to increased federal and presidential power as
evidence of the historical pedigree of their theory. See Yoo et al., supra note 245, at 10–93. It seems
unsurprising that during this period of economic and social consolidation, presidents sought to exert
their power and control. What is more notable is how the government adjusted to resist the impulse and
preserve the values of balance inherent in the separation of powers.
295. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 480–81.
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more directly political role. As the economy grew, even independent and
strong-willed attorneys general consulted the President on some cases,
especially antitrust cases that had important implications for national
economic development. Theodore Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Philander
Knox, for example, deferred to the President on individual antitrust
cases.296 Born of a generation of reformers, however, President Roosevelt
respected prosecutorial independence, insisting on bipartisan commissions
to investigate political corruption.297 Knox’s successor, George W.
Wickersham, at times, argued for instituting criminal prosecutions in
individual cases, but President Taft disagreed, urging civil action first.
Wickersham, like Knox, ultimately deferred to the President and declined
to bring criminal charges.298
In the famous Ballinger–Pinchot controversy in 1909, the Bar
Association and the public recoiled at the President’s interference with a
criminal investigation. President Taft appointed an anticonservationist,
Richard Ballinger, to serve as Secretary of the Interior. Gifford Pinchot, a
strong conservationist who had been appointed by William McKinley as
head of the Department of Forestry, accused Ballinger of corruptly
interfering with investigations out of his own personal interest in the
corporate targets.299 Despite evidence that this may in fact have occurred,
President Taft, relying on what he claimed were Attorney General
Wickersham’s investigation and recommendation, exonerated Ballinger
and fired Pinchot. President Taft himself later admitted that the
Wickersham letter was backdated to appear as if it had been prepared
before the firing when it was actually written after the fact. He relied
instead on the findings of an official within the Department of the Interior,
who was a political ally of Ballinger.300 While Taft admitted to rejecting the
legal opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, he insisted that the
Attorney General shared his view of the merits of the case.301 The President
had essentially used the Attorney General to undercut the normal criminal
justice process, which would have led to greater transparency at least.302
Some grew concerned at the growing power of the Attorney General,
296. LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 218 (1991).
297. Id. at 113.
298. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 343–44.
299. Christopher Yoo, a proponent of the unitary Executive, relies on this incident to support his
view. Christopher Yoo et al., supra note 245, at 43–44 (2004). Opposition to the incident, however, is
just as strong an indication of abiding faith in prosecutorial independence. Presidents at times favored a
docile and compliant Department of Justice, but the tradition of independence persisted.
300. President William Howard Taft to Sen. Knute Nelson (May 15, 1910), as reprinted in Taft
Wrote Ballinger Letter, S.F. CALL, May 16, 1910, at 1.
301. Id.
302. Short Talks on Current Events of Interest to Young Men, 18 LAW STUDENT’S HELPER 39,
39 (2010); Shreds of Suspicion, COLLIER’S, May 28, 1910, at 9–10.
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unchecked by the normal political processes. Philander Knox wrote, “The
consideration of the probable ultimate effect of the establishment of such
power in the hands of an administrative, non-judicial officer should give
rise to grave concern.”303 But, others remained sanguine that the separation
of the legal department from the business of administration would ensure
that the law remained unsullied and that the lawyers would fulfill their
semijudicial function “and gauge the temper of the courts.”304 The 1912
Attorney General Annual Report argued for greater consolidation of power
within the DOJ, suggesting that other departments with administrative
responsibilities threatened to corrupt the professional judgment of their
lawyers.305 Homer Cummings, Attorney General from 1933 to 1939, felt it
was a necessity for the DOJ to be independent and free from the “problems
of administrative expediency.”306
The battle over removal power stretched over years, with presidents
seeking to exert control over executive officers. The dispute culminated in
the Supreme Court decision Myers v. United States discussed above. Critics
worried that vesting removal power with the President would undermine
official independence.307 Edward Corwin, for instance, argued that it was
increasingly important to protect expert appointments and commissions
from political manipulation.308 The scientific idea of government, like the
scientific idea of law in vogue at the time, required individuals to resolve
complex problems by understanding and applying scientific research
methods to the facts.309 To promote this, Corwin echoed the Supreme
Court’s decision in Myers, by proposing that political appointees direct
policy but leave it to the permanent skilled professional class of bureaucrats
to administer it.310
The battle over court administration marked an interbranch competition
over power, with the Attorney General at the center. In 1922, Congress
passed the Judicial Conference Act, a compromise between the nationalists,
who advocated greater centralization and coordination of the Judiciary, and

303. Letter from William A. Day to Philander C. Knox (Jan. 13, 1914), in KNOX PAPERS (cited
in CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 345).
304. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 490-91.
305. 1912 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 57 (discussing objections to the Interstate Commerce
Commission having both the legal responsibility of assessing the scope of its jurisdiction and then
becoming a litigant in the proceedings).
306. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 518.
307. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION v–vii
(1927); James Hart, The Bearing of Myers v. United States Upon the Independence of Federal
Administrative Tribunals, 23 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 637, 657–58 (1929).
308. CORWIN, supra note 307, at vii.
309. Id.
310. Id. at viii.
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their adversaries, who were wary of the concentration of power.311 The
Attorney General was given the task of reporting on the business of the
federal courts and making recommendations.312 President Taft used the
Attorney General to try to exert control over the federal Judiciary and
Congress. But Congress was resistant, and when President Roosevelt tried
to control the Judiciary with the famous court-packing plan, Congress
passed a new act removing the Attorney General from the judicial administrative scheme.313 By eliminating the role of the Attorney General, the
Administrative Office Act of 1939 was designed to remove the courts from
presidential control and return power to the various circuit courts.314
Despite the persistent effort by presidents to use their attorneys general
to manage the courts, the position remained mostly insulated from political
disputes.315 The norm of loyalty battled with the norm of independence, but
neither receded entirely. Amidst the struggle for control over the Attorney
General, in reality, the DOJ still retained the legacy of its early diffuse
structure. United States Attorneys still retained a great deal of independence from “main justice,” often eluding the control of the Attorney
General.316
The New Deal and the political climate of the 1930s posed a series of
challenges to the nature of law and legal structures. The financial collapse
required greater central control over law, as well as other aspects of
governance.317 President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order
asserting the DOJ’s control over United States Attorneys and marshals.318
The growing complexity of the law coincided with threats of fascism from
Germany and communism from the Soviet Union. Amidst these minefields,
the United States had to find a way to legitimate an expansive administrative state in a pluralistic society.319 The Process School did so, in part,
by asking who ought to make decisions and which institutional structures
would prove optimal for each decision.320 Essentially, as H.L.A. Hart
311. PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 32–39
(1973).
312. Id. at 35–76.
313. Id. at 122–25.
314. Id. at 146.
315. CLAYTON, supra note 194, at 3–4.
316. BAKER, supra note 197, at 63–64; JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES:
U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 10 (1978).
317. Key, supra note 174, at 197.
318. Exec. Order 6166, § 5 (1933), www.dol.gov/sol/images/ExecutiveOrder6166.pdf.
319. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The Legal
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2047–48 (1994); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence
Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424, 443–
446 (1969).
320. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M.
BATER ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1988)); Guido
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would later explain, officials will always have to resolve indeterminacy in
the law. The key is choosing the officials and institutions that are best
situated to make reasoned choices.321
It is in this context that Attorney General Robert Jackson explained to a
room full of United States Attorneys that the political accountability that
comes with appointment and removal is not enough to assure justice. He
explained, “Your responsibility in your several districts for law
enforcement and for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered to
Washington, and ought not to be assumed by a centralized Department of
Justice.”322 He explained that Washington should rarely direct United
States Attorneys, who are best situated to ensure that justice is done.323 The
DOJ may have a role in establishing policy priorities and ensuring
uniformity in federal law but ought not manage individual cases. This
decentralized system of justice helps insulate prosecutors from the
corrosive effects of partisan politics.324 Their independence, not only from
political actors but also from mob sentiment, helps ensure that justice is
done despite times of fear or hysteria.
During World War II, President Roosevelt relied on his attorneys
general to help justify his political agenda. Attorney General Robert
Jackson, for instance, issued an opinion concluding that the United States
could sell ships to Great Britain before entering the war, without the
Senate’s approval.325 His successor, Attorney General Frances Biddle,
expressed initial reservations about the legality of Japanese internment
camps but ultimately went along with Roosevelt’s plan. Just months later,
Roosevelt instructed Biddle, against Biddle’s initial judgment, to try Nazi
saboteurs in military court where they could be executed.326 While presidents increasingly sought to use their attorneys general to help further
political ends, the DOJ itself maintained its identity as an independent
agency. Despite his own actions, Biddle expressed concern about the

Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body
Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2123 (2003).
321. See Hart, supra note 9.
322. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940).
323. Id. at 3–4.
324. Id. at 4. Many argued that politics were corrupting prosecution on both the federal and local
level. Standards for character and excellence were being replaced by partisan concerns that interfered
with the administration of justice. See, e.g., George E.Q. Johnson, Investigation and Detection of Crime
from the Prosecutor’s Viewpoint, 40 COM. L.J. 123, 125 (1940); Lloyd W. Kennedy, Local Politics vs.
Prosecuting Attorney, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 180, 181 (1940). Tenure in office and removal
from politics were seen as the remedy. What is a Department of Justice?, 19 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y
74, 76 (1935).
325. William R. Casto, Attorney General Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion of
Preclusive Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. REV. 364, 365–66 (2010).
326. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 21 J. SUP. CT. HIST. no. 1 1996, at 61, 65.
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political pressures to become a tool for partisan ends.327
F. Watergate and the Role of Professional Norms
Until recent events, the Saturday Night Massacre was the most public
assault on prosecutorial independence in American history. A less wellknown controversy during the Nixon administration also launched a debate
about the centrality of the independence of the DOJ to American democracy. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (IT&T) donated
$400,000 for the 1972 Republican National Convention to be held in San
Diego. At the time, IT&T’s future was dependent on federal law enforcement authorities. It needed DOJ approval to merge with Hartford Fire
Insurance, and it was in the midst of settling several other antitrust cases as
well. The White House tapes ultimately revealed that President Nixon
ordered then-Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to tell Richard
McLaren, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust, to drop the
IT&T appeal:
Nixon: I want something clearly understood, and, if it is not understood,
McLaren’s ass is to be out within one hour. The IT & T thing—stay the
hell out of it. Is that clear? That’s an order. . . .
Kleindienst: Okay.328

Attorney General John Mitchell tried to intervene to prevent Nixon from
undermining the independent antitrust enforcement. He later told
Kleindienst, “By the way . . . your friend at the White House says that you
can handle your fucking antitrust cases any way you want.”329 Nixon
criticized Mitchell for clinging to professional norms: “Mitchell . . . didn’t
want to be political.”330 In a memorandum to Haldeman, Nixon wrote:
“[W]hen Mitchell leaves as attorney general, we’re going to be better off in
my view . . . . John is just too damn good a lawyer, you know. He’s a good,
strong lawyer. It just repels him to do these horrible things, but they’ve got
to be done.”331
327. See, e.g., Dennis J. Hutchinson, Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg Trials, 21 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. no. 1, 1996, at 105, 110.
328. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF FOR THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG.,
Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Among the President, John Ehrlichman, and George Schultz on
April 19, 1971 from 3:03 to 3:34, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/watergate/
wspf/482-017_482-018.pdf. Kleindienst was later nominated to be Attorney General. In his confirmation hearings, he denied that the White House had interfered in the IT&T case. He later plead guilty
for failing to give truthful testimony in this exchange. JAMES ROSEN, THE STRONG MAN 186–220
(2008).
329. ROSEN, supra note 328, at 195.
330. Id. at 76 (alteration in original).
331. Id.
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Nixon acknowledged and dismissed the role of professional
independence in one breath. Before the President’s true motive was
revealed, the White House had defended itself on the ground that it
interfered in the antitrust case because the DOJ’s positions were
inconsistent with the Administration’s policy that bigness is not necessarily
unlawful.332 McLaren testified that he pursued the case because he felt that
he had an obligation to advance “the public interest.”333 Others in the DOJ
agreed that the appeal would have promoted the public interest in
effectively enforcing the antitrust laws.334 Without the benefit of the taped
conversations, it is hard for any third party to untangle proper policy
motivations from improper political or personal ones.
The Watergate scandal shocked the legal and political communities and
led them to examine the relationship between the White House and
government lawyers. While Part I explored the legal ramifications of the
scandal, this Part describes the formal articulation of professional values
that followed, as well as the structural changes that were designed to
preserve them. If the DOJ was born, in part, to protect prosecutorial
independence from the infiltration of partisan motives, it had fallen far
short of these expectations. As they debated different solutions, lawmakers
for the most part agreed that prosecutorial independence and professional
norms offered the best bulwark against the political appropriation of the
DOJ.
Ultimately, lawmakers concluded that it was impossible to enact laws
to prevent partisan corruption without simultaneously undermining the
political accountability of the chief prosecutor. Unwilling to sacrifice
accountability for independence, scholars and legislators returned to professionalism to protect against corruption. Ironically, this sentiment came at a
time when scholars and politicians were growing increasingly skeptical of
the ability of expertise and professionalism to preserve the integrity of
government process, and the country had just witnessed perhaps the
greatest failure of ethical norms to guide government actors. The respect
for expertise that had given rise to the administrative state was waning. Far
from the perfect antidote to corruption, experts and profes-sionals, it
seemed, were motivated by the same personal, private interests as politicians.335 Lawmakers, nonetheless, invoked an older ideal of professionalism and a faith that law and politics could be separated. In this context,
332. Nicholas Gage, Nixon Reported to Have Ordered I.T.T. Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30,
1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/30/archives/nixon-reported-to-have-ordered-itt-settlement-klei
ndienst-said-to.html.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1660–89;
Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 665–68 (2016).
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professional independence took on a new valence. Rather than denoting a
devotion to legal norms, it more closely resembled personal integrity and a
respect for process.
In the wake of the scandal, Senator Sam Ervin proposed a law that
would have made the DOJ independent from the Executive Branch.336
Another less radical bill introduced at the same time proposed a permanent
special counsel insulated from executive control.337 The discussion surrounding these bills amplified a chorus that had been building through-out
American history about the role of professional norms and expertise within
the Executive. Ultimately, legislators agreed to preserve the Executive
Branch’s control over government lawyers, but its power had to be limited
by professional norms. The changes in internal DOJ regulations similarly
reflected this respect for prosecutorial discretion and ethical obligations as
a limit on presidential power.
The hearings were full of eloquent statements about the rule of law and
lamentations about how politics had infiltrated the DOJ. As Senator Alan
Cranston explained, “[a]s the petty and gross misdeeds of Watergate
continue to come to light, we see more clearly the need for some machinery
independent of the executive which will ferret out and prosecute corruption
and wrongdoing in high levels of government.”338 He went on to qualify
that the Attorney General’s role as a prosecutor should form an important
restraint on presidential power: the Attorney General’s “client is not only
the President of the United States but includes the people.”339 The position
of the Attorney General, he lamented, had become a tool of the Administration, corrupted by power and politics, and the key was to restore the
professional independent role.340
Ervin’s bill was met with resistance. Even Senator Cranston, who
shared Ervin’s concerns, was hesitant to remove the Attorney General from
the political process. Accountability is perhaps the most fundamental check
on the abuse of power. But accountability alone had proven ineffective. As
Theodore Sorensen, former Special Counsel to President Kennedy
explained, the Attorney General should not become a “mere political arm
of the White House, motivated principally by partisan considerations, its

336. Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 1–3 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Sam Ervin).
337. Senator Alan Cranston introduced a more modest bill that would have created a permanent
special prosecutor. Id.
338. Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston).
339. Id.
340. Id.
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powers exploited for political ends.”341 But Sorensen hesitated to endorse
either bill:
An Attorney General of the caliber of Francis Biddle or Elliot Richardson
who recognizes that he is an officer of the court as well as a member of
the Cabinet, and that his client is the Nation as well as the President, will
have sufficient fidelity to both his professional and his public obligations
to resist improper White House intrusion without any change in the existing statutory or institutional arrangement.342

Professional training and norms must resolve the conflict between
political accountability and professional independence. Ervin summarized,
“So in the last analysis, in your judgment, the thing comes down to the
man.”343 Independence had grown synonymous with character and personal
integrity.
Expressing a stronger faith in the ability to distinguish law and politics,
Mitchell Rogovin, formerly an Assistant Attorney General explained:
While there may be a Republican way to conduct foreign policy which is
“politically and philosophically” different from the Democratic way, there
should be no acceptable difference in the manner in which a tax evasion
trial is conducted or a civil rights desegregation order is implemented.
Justice is not only blind, but she must also be nonpartisan.344

Some voiced a strong commitment to the power of the Executive, but
even they saw the law and professional norms as a restraint on presidential
control. Robert Dixon, a former Assistant Attorney General and scholar,
explained:
One aspect which the Framers never foresaw is the role of the bureaucracy. The Department is heavily staffed with lawyers of long experience
below the paper-thin political level. As a rule cases work their way up
through the Department with facts and law developed to the point that
political appointees could not make them disappear and go away, even if
they were so inclined.345

Despite his strong unitary view of the President’s power, Dixon
conceded that a prosecutor’s professional duty makes it inappropriate and
impossible for the President or any other political operative to interfere
with criminal cases.346 Emphasizing the practical reality of America’s

341. Id. at 15–16 (statement of Theodore C. Sorensen).
342. Id. at 16.
343. Id. at 22. Arthur Goldberg, former Justice of the Supreme Court, similarly opined: “Let us
appoint eminent Attorneys General, and let them be men who are capable of saying to a President, no,
the law does not permit this; I will not permit this; and you must not engage in activities such as have
been contemplated.” Id. at 63 (statement of Arthur Goldberg).
344. Id. at 41 (statement of Mitchell Rogovin).
345. Id. at 88 (statement of Richard G. Dixon, Jr.).
346. Id. at 103. Burke Marshall, the Deputy Dean of Yale Law School, and Arthur Miller,
professor at Harvard, had a similar exchange about the independence of professional lawyers. Marshall
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criminal justice system, he insisted that the diffuse nature of federal
prosecution ensures that those responsible for daily decisions are insulated
from illegitimate partisan concerns.347
Grappling with the difficulty in distinguishing proper policy motives
from partisan or personal interest, Watergate prompted a return to the
notion of professionalism.348 Professionalism and devotion to ethics
theoretically provide immunity from capture. As former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark explained, “[t]he U.S. Department of Justice . . . is peopled
in the main by Americans devoted to the rule of law and to justice.”349
Independence, in this formulation, is a personal trait rather than a natural
byproduct of the unique nature of the law. Former Solicitor General
Archibald Cox, who also served as Watergate special prosecutor until he
was fired, invoked norms of legal practice to explain the role of Attorney
General:
[I]t is every lawyer’s duty to give his client advice that the client may not
like to hear, to tell him what his obligations are under the law. That
obligation rests upon an Attorney General in dealing with his client, the
President, just as it does on all other lawyers.350

Just as the lawyer is not the client, so too the Attorney General is not the
President. In the modern political system, he will likely be a political ally
of the President, but he is not a servant. What distinguishes between the
two is the ethical obligation to apply the law in a fair, even-handed, and
disinterested way. While Cox may have overstated the equivalence
between a civil lawyer and the Attorney General, since the President is not
the prosecutor’s client, he nonetheless insisted on independence through
professional norms.
Although Ervin’s bill never passed, the sentiment behind it made its
way into departmental policies. The desire to preserve and nurture independence translated into a set of institutional rules. President Carter campaigned in part on the promise to take politics out of the administration of
justice, and his Attorney General, Griffin Bell, attempted to implement that
promise.351 In a speech to DOJ lawyers, he affirmed his faith in the
professional expertise of his audience:
I believe that our primary mission is to serve the Government as professionals, to exercise our independent judgment and to do our duty as we
commented, “The fact that people are appointed by a President because they agree with the President on
policy, does not mean that they are not professional nor that they are not competent.” Id. at 124.
347. Id. at 96–97.
348. Id. at 149 (statement of Charles E. Goodell); id. at 153 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach).
349. Id. at 168 (statement of Ramsey Clark).
350. Id. at 199 (statement of Archibald Cox).
351. The Honorable Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Att’y Gen, Address before Department of Justice
Lawyers 4 (Sept. 6, 1978) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/
2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf).
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see it. But the partisan activities of some Attorneys General in this century, combined with the unfortunate legacy of Watergate, have given rise
to an understandable public concern that some decisions at Justice may be
the products of favor, or pressure, or politics.352

He continued:
I believe that we in the Department are faithful to a high standard of
professionalism. I know from personal observation that the lawyers at
Justice are fiercely professional, steadfastly independent in their legal
judgment, regardless of outside pressures or controversy.353

With these inspirational thoughts in mind, he proposed several new
policies to preserve the independence of DOJ lawyers. First, he suggested
that all communications about particular cases from Congress or the White
House should be filtered through the Attorney General or his immediate
subordinates. Any disagreements between prosecutors and their supervisors
should be memorialized and reported. Benjamin Civiletti, who took over
from Bell in 1979, memorialized Bell’s policy suggestions.354
The Bar responded to revelations of the Watergate scandal with
increased commitment to ethics. It convened a new committee to study and
make recommendations on how to protect law enforcement from political
influence.355 Remarking that violations of ethical norms were so blatant, the
President of the American Bar Association, Robert Meserve, commented
that the solution was not a revision of the rules but rather a renewed
commitment to independence: “The first lesson of Watergate for [lawyers]
may be that we must constantly preserve our professional independence
and detachment—not only from the over-zealous client who seeks what is
improper, but from the urgings of our own ambition and self-interest.”356
Again, observers conflate professional independence with personal
integrity. Analyzing how so many lawyers could have participated in illegal
conduct, Meserve speculated that exposure to politics may have led them to
forget the professional detachment that accompanies law practice.357
Praising former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, the incoming
President of the Bar insisted on professional independence. He rooted this
obligation not in the distinct nature of law but rather in the “traditions of

352. Id. at 3.
353. Id. at 4.
354. Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Heads of Offices, Bds.,
Bureaus, & Divs. (Oct. 18, 1979), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/1018-1979.pdf.
355. Robert W. Meserve, Action 1972–73—American Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. J. 986, 986
(1973).
356. Watergate Is Focus of Attention at the Annual Meeting, 18 A.B.A. NEWS, Sept. 1973, at 4
(alteration in original).
357. Robert W. Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and Challenges for the Legal Profession, 59
A.B.A. J. 681, 681 (1973).
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the legal profession.”358 Insofar as independence denoted something
distinct from character, it was rooted in the nature of a lawyer’s job and the
routines of practice.
G. After Watergate
In the scandals that comprise recent history, the concept of
prosecutorial independence forms both the basis for outrage and the
solution. In the aftermath of Watergate, the term has evolved to denote,
primarily, independence from presidential control. Congress toyed with
whether court-appointed special prosecutors are necessary to protect prosecutorial independence, and in 1978, it experimented with the Ethics in
Government Act, which mandated such a solution. But when it allowed the
law to sunset, Congress recognized the cost that the Act had to political
accountability. While how best to attain it remained in dispute, there was
little controversy over the goal: preserving professional discretion from the
power of interested executive officials. The solution for conflicts of interest
in government officials was prosecutorial independence, rather than a
separate independent agency.
The tides rise and fall, and by the time President Reagan took office,
the alarm prompted by Watergate had subsided. President Reagan sought to
increase the power of the Executive and consolidate control over it. Edwin
Meese, President Reagan’s loyal supporter and Attorney General from
1983 to 1987, allegedly tipped off the White House about an investigation
into the Iran–Contra controversy.359
But throughout this period in which the President exercised strong
executive control, prosecutorial independence remained an important
check—a tradition and norm that assumed, and deserves, a more
permanent, unmalleable role in the law.360 In December 2006, President
George W. Bush tried to fire seven United States Attorneys at once.361
Critics recoiled at the targeted removal of individual prosecutors in the
middle of the President’s term.362 Members of both parties criticized what
358. Smith: Restore the Prosecutor, 18 AM. BAR. NEWS, Nov. 1973, at 12.
359. HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS, TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN &
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN & THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION,
REPORT OF THE CONG. COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN–CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at
305 (1987).
360. In arguing that certain government officials can be removed by the President despite their
work for quasi-judicial entities, the Office of Legal Counsel has reaffirmed the notion that prosecutorial
independence is sufficient to protect against corruption. See Presidential Appointees—Removal
Power—Civil Serv. Reform Act—Constitutional Law (Article II, § 2, cl. 2), 2 Op. O.L.C. 120, 121
(1978).
361. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1202
(2013).
362. Id.
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seemed like a failure to respect the nonpartisan character of local
prosecutors’ offices, and after extensive hearings, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales was forced to resign.363 Replacing many United States
Attorneys as an incoming president remains common practice—a means of
ensuring that administration priorities are honored.364 But when a president
fires individual prosecutors at later points, it is suspect, largely because it
seems as if the President is infusing impermissible partisan concerns into
individual cases.365 As Adrian Vermeule argues with regard to agencies, the
convention of prosecutorial independence has become a part of the
structure of American government.366
III. POLICY REASONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE
The tradition of prosecutorial independence has evolved from the
inchoate reality of prosecution in the early republic into a way to protect
against partisan corruption and, finally, as a check on presidential power.
The values behind the separation of powers were buttressed by the norm of
prosecutorial independence as the reality of criminal law enforcement
changed.367 Prosecutorial independence is essential to protect those values
by preserving individual liberty and preventing the accumulation of power.
The structure of American government is so vastly different now than
it was at the founding that we cannot protect liberty and avoid tyranny
without accounting for the historical development of our institutions.
Prosecutorial independence has evolved to prevent any individual or group
from amassing too much power—the goal of the separation-of-powers
doctrine.368 Allowing a President to control the investigation and prosecution of members of his own Administration, for instance, epitomizes just
the sort of accumulation of power that James Madison and others hoped to
thwart.369 Although proponents of the unitary Executive claim that political
accountability will provide a meaningful check on federal enforcement
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1201–02.
365. Id. at 1202–03.
366. Id. at 1201–03.
367. For a discussion of the importance of unwritten norms, see id. at 1218–32. For an argument
that the Madisonian goal of avoiding tyranny at the heart of the separation-of-powers doctrine ought to
inform the Supreme Court’s analysis of any issue involving the structure of government, see Rebecca L.
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1991).
368. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996)
(explaining the policy goal of the separation-of-powers doctrine was to prevent the accumulation of
power and arguing that checks on executive power fulfill those original goals).
369. In Federalist 47, James Madison wrote, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937).
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power,370 prosecutors cannot generally be held politically accountable
because their discretionary decisions are rarely publicly justified and often
entirely opaque. It is even harder to hold a politician politically accountable
for the acts of prosecutors.
The historical evidence in Part II suggests that the unitary theory of the
Executive does not have as long a pedigree as its proponents argue, at least
with regard to criminal law enforcement.371 Of course, Christopher Yoo,
Steven Calebresi, and others have recounted important incidents where
presidents exerted their control over the federal bureaucracy, but that is
unsurprising. What is more notable is that these efforts failed. There were
pockets of independence and separate fiefdoms of power. Because of the
decentralized nature of their work, early federal prosecutors, attorneys
general, and later DOJ lawyers were among those who resisted presidential
control. Far from being consolidated under presidential control, most
federal criminal prosecution in the early republic was local, and many cases
were brought by state actors and private individuals.
Scholarship on the allocation of power within the Executive recognizes
that checks and balances come, not only from competition between the
three branches, but from the competing structures and actors within each
branch. Administrative law seeks to exploit this division of power.372 By
allocating responsibility to different professionals, experts, career civil
servants, and political appointees, administrative law recognizes the
potential for those with expertise and experience to counteract partisan
incentives, while preserving political accountability. Particularly, knowledge and experience are central to the impartial exposition of facts. And
facts, in turn, are critical to the transparency needed to ensure true political
accountability.
Official discretion may pose a cost to efficiency, but it is one we are
willing to make to ensure the public interest. Justice Brandeis explained in
his dissent in Myers,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.373

370. Andrias, supra note 53, at 1108–09; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 121, at 543–50;
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11, at 3.
371. Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. Pᴀ. J.
Cᴏɴsᴛ. L. 313, 314, 318–23 (2010).
372. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032 (2011); Michaels, supra note 11.
373. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The discretion of United States Attorneys and line prosecutors
promotes the fair and even-handed administration of justice.374 Albeit
imperfect, professional judgment provides the strongest protection for the
value of impartial justice. Prosecutors wield massive power. We expect
them to sort through facts and judge the credibility of witnesses. Their job
demands that they exercise their discretion based on these facts, free from
all bias, including partisan interest. To preserve a fair criminal justice
system, prosecutors are trained to be consistent across cases and to exercise
their judgment in light of broad principles, such as proportionality. This is
not an easy task; American prosecutors sometimes fail;375 but presidential
influence over individual cases would only make matters worse.376
As H.L.A. Hart explained in a recently discovered essay, official
discretion is not the same as whim.377 Discretion involves practical
wisdom, the effort to do something wise or sound, and drawing on
experience and expertise to solve a problem. Having made similar choices
repeatedly under the same conditions and institutional restraints, certain
individuals are trained to make thoughtful decisions with a careful eye
toward potential hazards.378 Discretion, Hart argues, is not a threat to the
rule of law but rather both necessary to and consistent with it.379 But it has
to rest with the actors who are best situated to draw on experience and
expertise to make principled decisions in light of particular sets of facts.
Institutions and structures of government can promote this kind of reasoned
decision-making by dispersing responsibility among the appropriate
actors.380 Hart’s essay provides a jurisprudential defense of intra-branch
checks and balances.381
Prosecutors enjoy vast discretion. In determining what justice requires,
prosecutors must identify and prioritize societal aims, like safety,
374. Green & Roiphe, supra note 9.
375. Angela Davis has argued that the problem with prosecutors is their lack of accountability.
Davis, supra note 32, at 395–400. But even she proposes transparency as the solution rather than
executive control over decision-making. Id. at 460–64.
376. Social media has allowed the President an unprecedented influence, even absent a mandate
to direct individual cases. By repeatedly calling the investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016
election a “witch hunt” on social media, the President has asserted his political influence. By tweeting a
demand for an investigation into whether the FBI and DOJ “infiltrated” his campaign, see Donald
Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (May 20, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/998256454590193665?lang=en, President Trump has all but attempted to take over the legal
department. While there is no proof that individual investigators or prosecutors have been influenced by
these public declarations, it is a clear violation of the DOJ regulations designed to insulate individual
prosecutors from partisan influence.
377. See Hart, supra note 9, at 656–64.
378. Id. at 657.
379. Id.
380. Geoffrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127
Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 666, 706–07 (2013).
381. Id. at 674–75.
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individual liberty, the preservation of government resources, deterrence,
retribution, and rehabilitation. In addition, they have to determine whether
certain conduct fits within a criminal statute. Our system vests this discretion in prosecutors because, in theory, their experience, expertise, and
proximity to the facts situate them well to make these determinations.
While they often disappoint,382 others might well do worse. The more
focused an individual is on personal or political gain, the more likely that
this exercise of discretion will be distorted, priorities warped, and factual
determinations skewed.383
Prosecutors are trained to exercise their discretion in a disinterested
way, but conflicts of interest threaten to undermine this impartial decisionmaking. Partisan political interests create conflicts by infusing impermissible personal and political ambitions into decisions that ought to be made
in the public interest. As Lloyd Cutler noted during the hearings on Senator
Ervin’s proposal to create an independent law department after Watergate,
it makes little sense to interpret the separation-of-powers doctrine to “force
us to tolerate conflicts of interest on the part of the President, the Attorney
General and their immediate assistants that we cannot and do not tolerate in
ordinary judges and lawyers.”384
The President and his political appointees are more susceptible than
prosecutors to illegitimate political motivations. Allocating responsibility
for decisions in individual cases to career prosecutors who are lower down
in the hierarchy helps achieve the fair and disinterested administration of
criminal justice by making these sorts of conflicts less likely. The DOJ
regulations developed in the aftermath of Watergate similarly serve as
prophylactics, protecting United States Attorneys and their assistants from
political pressure.385
The traditional view of separation of powers evolved as the
administrative state changed. The role of experts and professionals within
government complicates the initial understanding. There are several
382. The literature on the damage wrought by prosecutors is vast. See, e.g., Green &
Yaroshefsky, supra note 33, at 656–72 (discussing the new rhetoric about prosecutorial wrongdoing).
383. Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 472.
384. Removing Politics from the Admin. of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 241 (1974).
385. For instance, former FBI Director James Comey chose not to widely circulate his
memorialized conversation with President Trump, in which the President asked him to back off the
Michael Flynn investigation, within the office because he was concerned about impermissible political
considerations infiltrating the FBI and United States attorneys’ offices. Open Hearing with Former FBI
Director James Comey: Hearing Before S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 19 (2017). He
saw his role, in part, as gatekeeper, preventing partisan concerns from drifting down into individual
decisions that ought to be made for other reasons. See id. Rod Rosenstein, similarly, has defended
Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Spencer Ackerman, Mueller’s Boss Pledges to Protect Russia Probe
Against GOP: ‘I Would Not’ Fire Him, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.
com /rod-rosenstein-pledges-to-protect-muellers-russia-probe-against-gop-i-would-not-fire-him.
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problems with the argument for a unitary Executive, in addition to its
inconsistency with the historical tradition of prosecutorial independence
discussed in Part II. Traditional checks and balances do not always work.
The idea behind three coequal branches was, essentially, to create different
zones of power, each competing for authority and checking the others
along the way. But, as scholars have argued, Congress has grown increasingly passive, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In an age of
partisan politics, Congress is even more likely to abdicate its power when
the same party controls both Congress and the Executive Branch. Without
effective legislative and judicial checks, there is an even greater need to
police political actors to ensure that they comply with the law. Lawyers can
and do serve this role. They (along with other experts in the administrative
state) have evolved into a separate zone of power. Courts and legislators
should read the law and design the structure of government to protect this
role.
The history of the prosecutorial independence in Part II suggests that
this is not an accidental twist. The American state has always been diffuse,
and the myriad zones of power have always comprised substantial and
important checks on power.386 The three separate branches were designed
to balance accountability with checks on potential abuses of power. Since
the founding, but particularly since 1870, lawmakers viewed prosecutorial
discretion as a piece of this puzzle. In creating the DOJ, Congress believed
that the consolidation of prosecutorial power under the Executive would
foster professional values, which, in turn, would prevent the abuses of
personal and partisan interest.
The effort to exert total control over the DOJ is part of a larger pattern
in which the current President has undermined the institutions of democracy and the rule of law by insisting that all decisions with which he does
not agree are motivated by political animus and whim. He attacked the
credibility of Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over the class action
lawsuits against Trump University.387 He criticized judges who overruled
his travel ban388 and has repeatedly attacked the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies.389 Faith in the fair administration of justice is critical
to the rule of law and democracy. Preserving prosecutorial independence is
386. Novak, supra note 289.
387. Nina Totenberg, Who is Judge Gonzalo Curiel, The Man Trump Attacked for His Mexican
Ancestry?, NPR (June 7, 2016, 7:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481140881/who-is-judgegonzalo-curiel-the-man-trump-attacked-for-his-mexican-ancestry.
388. Josh Gerstein & Eli Stokols, Trump Lashes Out at Judge Who Put His Travel Ban on Ice,
POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-travel-ban-legal-win-234634 (last updated
Feb. 4, 2017, 9:16 PM).
389. Sharon LaFraniere, Katie Benner & Peter Baker, Trump’s Unparalleled War on a Pillar of
Society: Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/us/
politics/trump-fbi-justice.html.
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one way to ensure the disinterested and even-handed application of
criminal law.
CONCLUSION
The history of the American administrative state in general and federal
prosecution in particular includes competing themes. Since the founding,
proponents of a strong consolidated Executive have vied with those who
advocate significant checks on executive power. Politics and expediency
often propelled that debate. As this central disagreement made its way into
the twentieth century, however, official independence, expertise, and
professionalism took on an increasingly important role.
At the beginning, prosecutorial independence was almost taken for
granted, a product of the scattered, local nature of federal prosecution.
While individual presidents did interfere in prosecutions, their ability to do
so was limited. As federal criminal law grew more complex, legislators and
critics recognized the need for national organization to combat waste,
inefficiency, and corruption. The professional expert nature of the DOJ was
critical to its mission from its inception. As the New Deal government
expanded, the allocation of power among units within the Executive
became vital to preserve the legitimacy of the system. Prosecutorial independence developed as a central norm during this period. In the aftermath
of Watergate, legislators elaborated on the notion of professional independence as a fundamental check on presidential power.
Congress has acknowledged and acquiesced in the DOJ’s independence. DOJ regulations articulated by Bell and implemented by Civiletti
are more than mere etiquette. These professional norms of practice are a
fundamental component of a functioning democracy and a key check on the
accumulation of power.
As politicians, scholars, and lawyers concluded in the hearings after the
Watergate scandal, fully isolating the DOJ from the Executive might
diminish political accountability. But political accountability is meaningless unless investigators and prosecutors are independent of politics, free to
find and publicize facts according to a strict process and without the
distortion and spin of politics. Respect for prosecutorial independence and
professional norms deserves significant weight in interpreting the law
governing the allocation of criminal justice power between the President,
the Attorney General, and other federal prosecutors.
As the criminal justice system changed throughout the twentieth
century, the meaning of prosecutorial independence shifted as well, growing to denote personal integrity and a method of thinking critically about
certain kinds of problems. While prosecutors sometimes fail to live up to
expectations, they are better situated than the President to make sound,

1 GREEN-ROIPHE-1-76 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/17/2018 10:59 AM

Can the President Control the Department of Justice?

75

disinterested prosecutorial decisions in individual cases in light of the
evidence and prosecutorial policies and traditions.
The history and policy strongly suggest that, as a general matter, the
Attorney General and subordinate prosecutors may not accept direction
from the President but must make the ultimate decisions about how to
conduct individual investigations and prosecutions, even at the risk of
being fired for disobeying the President. The Constitution does not
determine whether ultimate authority rests with the President or the
prosecutors, leaving Congress to decide. Congress has not explicitly
answered the question, but its silence since the late nineteenth century in
the face of the evolving importance of prosecutorial independence suggests
that Congress has acquiesced in a relationship in which the President may
express views to the Attorney General, but the ultimate authority rests with
the Attorney General or with subordinate prosecutors to whom the
Attorney General delegates authority.
In the first two hypotheticals posed by Part I, the Attorney General
must disregard and disobey the President’s direction to indict a political
opponent or to dismiss charges against a political ally because the President’s motivations are partisan and because conventional prosecutorial
norms and policies dictate a different result. The hard question, which we
leave for another day, is posed by the last hypothetical, in which the
President, pursuing legitimate foreign policy objectives, directs prosecutors
to file espionage charges that are weak but supported by probable cause.
This scenario creates a tension between the President’s enumerated power
under the Constitution and the Attorney General’s implied authority under
legislation. Here, some perceive, presidential preeminence is a necessity.
Perhaps so. But absent such a powerful presidential claim of constitutional
authority, history and policy suggest that prosecutors must answer to the
law, not the President.

